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LATIN-AMERICAN LAND REFORM: THE
USES OF CONFISCATION
Kenneth L. Karst*
Latin America, every land reform is motivated principally by
political demands for equality, for the redistribution of wealth
and income. The statement is true even in those countries where the
governments are hostile to the idea of redistribution. Palliatives
that exploit the ambiguity of the word "reform" in such countries
are aimed at appeasement of the demand for sharing the wealth.
Landless peasants and landowners understand perfectly well; yet,
many technicians and students of land reform continue to speak a
different language, a language in which land reform means anything
from agricultural rent control to the introduction of hybrid corn.1
In part, talk of this kind is the product of sophistication. No
responsible government can simply carve big estates into little ones
and then stop. Once a decision is made to divide the land, staggering responsibilities fall on the government: agricultural credit and
marketing, rural education and technical assistance, housing-none
can be neglected. Those who administer such programs may be forgiven for emphasizing that their reforms are "integral," involving
more than land distribution.2 Nevertheless, these other functions
are secondary and dependent; all of the reforms have as their chief
purpose consolidation of the redistribution.3
"Land reform" is ·written into the Charter of Punta del Este, the
basic document of the Alliance for Progress.4 But, even today,
United States policy reflects some uncertainty about the content of
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• Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.-Ed. I am grateful to my colleague, Professor William T. Burke, who criticized a draft of this article.-K.L.K.
1. Those who speak for the United States Government frequently reflect this rather
comfortable view. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T STATE, LAND REFORM-A WORLD CHALLENGE 4-5
(1952); Henderson, U.S. Views on Agrarian Reform, 41 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 887, 888
(1959).
2. E.g., GIMENEZ LANDINEZ, EVALUCION DE LA REFoRMA AcRARIA ANTE EL CoNGRES0
NACIONAL (Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, 1962); Lleras Restrepo, Estructura de la Reforma Agraria, in TIERRA: 10 ENSAY0S SoBRE LA REF0RMA AcRARIA EN
COLOMBIA 11, 13 (1962).
3. The point has been made forcefully by a number of writers. See FLORES, LAND
REFORM AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PR.OGRESS (1963); WARRINER., LAND REFORM AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1955); Barraclough, Lo Que Implica una Reforma Agraria, 15
PANORAMA ECONOMICO 123 (1962); Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America,
in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: EssAYs AND COMMENTS 161, 162 n.l (Hirschman ed. 1961);
Galbraith, Conditions for Economic Change in Underdeveloped Countries, 33 J. FARM
ECONOMICS 689, 694-96 (1951).
4. See text at note 8 infra.
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that expression. President Johnson, on the third anniversary of the
founding of the Alliance, employed this omnibus description:
"Through land reform aimed at increased production, taking
different forms in each country, we can provide those who till
the soil with self-respect and increased income, and each country
with increased production to feed the hungry and to strengthen
their economy."5
Since those words were spoken on a diplomatic occasion, perhaps
they can be tolerated; they are indeed diplomatic, for they permit
everyone to fill in his own preferred meaning for the statement's
most important term. 6 The reason for the ambiguity is that the goals
of the Alliance contain a built-in conflict.
The Alliance, as Fidel Castro boasts and despite regular official
denials, was a reaction to the Cuban revolution. Its main purpose
was to improve living standards in order to avoid violent upheaval
in other countries; grants were to be conditioned upon the making
of "institutional improvements which promise lasting social progress."7 It is not enough to protest that the Alliance seeks to improve
health, nutrition, literacy, and housing because that is the right
thing to do; it was the right thing to do a long time ago, but this
country did it only after Castro's emergence as a revolutionary
symbol. Social and economic development was thought to be a peaceful alternative to revolution, particularly revolution with cold-war
overtones. It was recognized from the first, however, that an important cause of stagnation in the Latin-American economy was the
land tenure structure. The Alliance proposed "to encourage ... programs of integral agrarian reform, leading to the effective transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land
tenure and use; with a view to replacing latifundia [the large estates
of the traditional landed oligarchy] and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of property .... " 8 The phrase "where required" leaves
5. Address by President Johnson, Pan American Union, March 16, 1964. JOHNSON,
THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 8 (U.S. Dep't of State 1964).
6. Dr. Thomas Carroll has noted a striking demonstration of ambiguity in our
national policy in two speeches of Hon. Teodoreo Moscoso, one pitched to the "social
justice" theme and the other playing down redistribution and emphasizing the modernization of agriculture, "supervised credit and extension service, and farm-to-market
roads." Carroll, Land Reform as an Explosive Force in Latin America, in EXPLOSIVE
FoRCES IN LATIN AMERICA 81, ll2-13 (TePaske and Fisher ed. 1964). The leverage that
the Alliance can bring to bear on Latin-American governments is discussed in Note,
The Chilean Land Reform: A Laboratory for Alliance-for-Progress Techniques, 73
YALE L.J. 310, 327-33 (1963).
7. President Kennedy's Message to Congress, 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 474, 476 (1961).
8. Charter of Punta del Este, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1961, p. 8, col. 3.

December 1964]

The Uses of Confiscation

329

some political leeway, but the message nonetheless is clear: the
United States is ready to support land reform. To most Latin Americans that means tedistribution on the pattern of the Mexican,
Bolivian, and even Cuban models.
A redistribution of wealth and income, however, cannot fail to
produce a realignment of political power in the reformed countries;
to prevent a Castro-style revolution, the United States is thus committed to encouraging a revolution that it trusts will be peaceful and
made principally within the existing structure. Misery alone is not
enough to make a revolution; revolutions are born of hope, not
despair, and that is why Ambassador Stevenson's phrase, "the revolution of rising expectations," fits Latin America so well. The Cuban
revolution and the Alliance for Progress have, in uncomfortable
combination, raised hopes of varying kinds throughout the region.
Thus, the question now is not whether Latin America will have a
revolution, but rather what kind it will have. 9
Not the least of the tensions involved in the formulation of
United States policy toward Latin America is antagonism between
the need to make radical changes in land tenure structures and the
interest of some North-American investors in preserving their holdings in land. The issues here are not simple. We are not faced with
the easy choice between the Nation's broad political goal of hemispheric security and the narrow goal of profit for a few investors.
Private investment is an indispensable ingredient of the Alliance's
success. The Alliance, after all, aims to supply capital as the basis for
sustained growth, and private foreign investment is plainly a key
source of capital, one not lightly to be discouraged. 10 It is sometimes
said, not without cynicism, that the United States supported land
reform in Bolivia because little or none of the land was held by its
o·wn investors. 11 Whatever the truth of that charge, this country
has now placed its weight on the side of land reform, "where required," and, presumably, that does not exclude countries in
which there are substantial North-American investments in land.
There is no reason to assume that all or even most such NorthAmerican interests will be affected by a land reform, 12 but it would
9. See SZULC, THE WINDS OF REvOLUTION (1963).
10. Mr. David Rockefeller has ably defended the view that the Alliance has given
excessive emphasis to government-to-government assistance, failing to take advantage
of private investment's full developmental potential. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1964, p.
46, col. 4. On the role of foreign capital as an important transmitter of modem technology, see URQUIDI, VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DE AMERICA LATINA 101-12 (1962).
11. See FLORES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
12. See text at note 98 infra.
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be foolish not to recognize that some such interests are bound to be
affected.
Although the political setting for land reform in Latin America
is revolutionary, the reforming governments normally have not
admitted to charges of confiscation. Normally, they have claimed
to compensate the expropriated landowners. If not, then they have
asserted some traditional "legal" justification for taking without
compensation, such as that the government is merely restoring the
land to its true owners. This article examines the legislative techniques for taking land, showing their confiscatory operation. For
many lawyers, the analysis would then be easily completed: confiscation is wrongful and must be condemned. Rejecting the implicit
absolutism of that conclusion, this article inquires into the justifications that can be pleaded on behalf of selective confiscation as an
aid in solving some of Latin America's economic and social ills.
We begin with Mexico, both for historical reasons and because
the theory of restitution it has employed is a good analytical starting
place. Following discussion of the Mexican experience are analyses of
two techniques of "compensation" that have been used by reforming
governments in order to avoid making prompt payment of the
market value of expropriated land. The justifications for confiscating
certain kinds of interests are then considered through an examination of the legislative content of "the social function of ownership."
That examination raises one last question: If the reforming governments of Latin America regard confiscation as legitimate, why should
they try to hide what they are doing? In that context, the concluding
discussion explores the borderland between useful rationalization
and simple dishonesty.

I.

MEXICO: THE THEORY OF RESTITUTION

Latin America's first effective land reform occurred in Mexico;
it began in this century and reached its peak of redistributive activity
only a generation ago. The Mexican reform was premised originally
upon a theory of restitution. Madero's Plan of San Luis Potosi, the
first basic document of the 1910 Revolution, included this promise:
"let [the lands taken from the Indians] be restored to their original
owners, to whom shall also be paid an indemnity for prejudice suffered.''18 "Land and Liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution's
13. Para. 3, Plan de San Luis Potosi, in FABILA, CINCO SIGLOS DE l.EGISLACION AGRAIUA.
EN MEXICO (1493-1940), at 209 (1941); also in 1 SILVA HERzoc, BREVE HlsTORIA DE LA
REVOLUCION MEXICANA 133, 138 (2d ed. 1962).
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agrarian side, but the idea was hardly original. From the times of the
Viceroys, throughout the colonial era and the first century of Mexican independence, the restitution of land to the Indians was a popular theme.14 The very recurrence of the idea suggests that the various
restorative decrees were carried out less than scrupulously.
Encroachment on the lands of the Mexican villages was not just
a matter of pushing the Ind.ians out, North American style. Because
the indigenous populations of Mexico had been settled in agricultural communities, it was more convenient to enslave them than to
eliminate them. Encroachments on their land and on their personal
liberty were thus inseparable parts of a single process, a process that
began with a distribution of Indians among the conquistadors for
use as slave labor15 and culminated in a series of dazzling legal moves
aimed at "confirming" titles in a few landholding families. 16 Thus
14. The first official attempt to restore lands wrongfully taken from the Indian
villages was made in 1535; by royal decree, the Viceroy of New Spain was directed to
inform himself concerning the land and tax abuses that had been reported in Spain
and to take action to return the Indians' land to them. Ccdula of May 81, 1535 in
FAnILA, op. cit. supra note 18, at 18. For later decrees of the colonial era, see id. at 26,
29, !l0, 42, 49, &: 58.
15. The repartimiento was, literally, a distribution of Indians. When complaints
were made against the system's inhumanity, the encomienda was invented as a substitute. See McBRIDE, THE LAND SYSTEMS OF MEXICO 43 (1928). Indians were then "entrusted" to certain Spaniards who undertook to make them Christian. The royal decrees
established safeguards for the Indians' persons and property: "[But soon] the system lost
its original character and became simply a method of land tenure, since the colonists soon
came to look upon the districts assigned to them as being virtually their own and to
regard the native agriculturists as their serfs." Id. at 45. The allotment to Cortes was
enormous. "The areas claimed must have amounted to not less than 25,000 square miles
and contained a total population of some 115,000 people ••••" Id. at 47. Compare
CRIST, THE CAUCA VALLEY, COLOMBIA! LAND TENURE AND LAND USE 15 (1952), describing the use of Indians as agricultural workers for the haciendas and as pack animals
on mountain trails.
16. Titles to the encomienda lands were confirmed in periodic surveys, during
which each rightful possessor was entitled to a composicion, a settlement or confirmation of his title. The village leaders were often unaware of the necessity for securing
composiciones. Unconfirmed village lands were then subject to occupation as Crown
lands, and might later be confirmed in new surveys. In the early eighteenth century, a
decree authorized the denunciation of illegal (unconfirmed) occupancies by persons
having knowledge of them, who might themselves claim the lands upon the payment of
a fee. See FABILA, op. cit. supra note 18, at 84; WHETIEN, RURAL MEXICO 82-85 (1948).
The war for independence from Spain began in 1810 partly as a social revolution.
Father Hidalgo sought the Indians' support in these terms: "Will you make the effort
to recover from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your forefathers three
hundred years ago?" Quoted in GRUENING, MEXIco AND rrs HERITAGE 80 (1928). But the
great landowners and their allies captured the revolution and the succession of governments that followed it. After the brief mid-century flirtation with reform (see note 18
infra), Mexico's government returned to normal. Under the Diaz regime (1876-1910),
new devices were invented for despoiling the villages: A law for colonization of "idle"
lands was interpreted to permit new denunciations and claims, after the fashion of the
composicion; the private control of water rights permitted land companies to stop the
supply of water to the villages, forcing them to abandon their land, which might then
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were born the haciendas, the great estates that have been the chief
target of land reformers in Mexico and throughout Latin America.17
Curiously, the centralizing of land ownership not only survived
during the mid-nineteenth century Reform movement, but it even
accelerated.18 Thus, until the Revolution of 1910, virtually nothing
of a serious nature was done to restore the village lands.
That Revolution also began as just another political revolt, but
it soon took on an agrarian cast. Now the promise of land to the
villages began to be carried out by revolutionary generals such as
Zapata, who seized land and divided it among the campesinos. 19 Yet,
even in the midst of civil war, Zapata recognized the need for establishing the legitimacy of his land distributions. His Plan of Ayala
proposed the restitution of village lands that had been usurped and
the expropriation (compensated) of one-third of the great estates for
distribution among the landless who had no claim of restitution.20
Zapata and others may be excused for failing to specify in detail
the kinds of usurpation that would justify restitution; they were concerned primarily with getting and holding support for the Revolution, and one does not issue a call to arms in the language of a statute.
As the Revolution continued, many of the great estates were simply
occupied, either by the campesinos or by revolutionary generals,
without the formality of court decrees or legislation. "Restitution
dates from the days the peasants seized land forcibly and then sought
legal justification."21
be occupied; the army destroyed some villages in punishment for "rebellion," and
political friends of the regime moved in. SIMPSON, THE EJmo: MEJaco's WAY OUT 29-31
(1937).
17. FORD, MAN AND LAND IN PERU 21-52 (1955); McBRIDE, op. dt. supra note 15, at
25-81.
18. A mortmain law, enacted in 1856 to break the power of the Church, was directed
at corporate landholdings, with an exception for village communal lands. Art. 8, Ley
de Desamortizaci6n de Bienes de Manos Muertas, June 25, 1856, in FABILA, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 103, 104. The constitution of 1857 omitted the exception in its article
27 [TENA RAMIREZ, LEYES FUNDAMENTALES DE MEXICO, 1808-1957, at 606, 610 (1957)] and
was interpreted to apply to the villages as well as to other corporate owners. The
resulting fragmentation of village lands led directly to their piecemeal purchase by
speculators and their ultimate consolidation in the haciendas.
19. See DIAZ SoTO Y GAMA, LA GuESTroN AGRARIA EN MEXICO 18-19 (1959). The word
campesino is used instead of "peasant" because the latter word calls to mind images
of the European peasantry, many of which are inappropriate in the Latin-American
context.
20. Paras. 6 and 7, Plan de Ayala, in FABILA, op. cit. supra note 13, at 214, 215-16.
Paragraph 8 of the Plan proposed the confiscation of all lands of those who might
oppose the Revolution; these lands were to be considered as war indemnity and
were to be used to provide pensions for the widows and orphans of revolutionary
soldiers.
21. SENIOR, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 25 (1958).
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The "seizure" or "occupation" frequently, even typically,
amounted to nothing more than the expulsion of the supervisors
who managed the estates for absentee landowners. In such cases, the
Indians continued to work the lands they had always worked and
continued to live in the villages that had been enveloped by the
haciendas. The differences were that they no longer recognized the
right of the former owners to the crops raised and the central buildings of the hacienda were taken over for community use as hospitals,
schools, or other public purposes.
In three different respects, this continuity of the people on the
land adds justification to the claim of restitution. First, under these
circumstances, restitution was less disruptive economically and
socially than would have been a restitution that tore one group
away from the lands it worked and replaced it with another group.
Second, the persons to whom restitution was made22 were the
very ones whose previous labor under conditions of near-slavery
had contributed substantially to the value of the land. Finally,
the presence of the beneficiaries on the land, along with the decision
to make restitution to villages rather than to individuals, eliminated
the problem of locating "lost heirs" of the victims of earlier despoilment.
However well-founded the restitution theory may have been, it
basically functioned as a rationalization for the agrarian phase of
the social revolution. If there had been no continuity of the kind
described, if the descendants of villagers long ago despoiled had
been scattered instead of bound to the land, then restitution would
scarcely have been a popular theme. Social revolutionaries are
concerned with making a social reform, not with the purification of
titles, and the main thrust of the revolution was to give the land to
those who were working it. What the restitution theory gave to the
Revolution was a basis in traditional legality for the transfer of
wealth and power to the revolutionary classes.
Land reform legislation embodying the principle of restitution
was first decreed in 1915,23 and then incorporated into the Constitution of 1917.2.., Although it was emergency legislation-the military
22. The land was distributed to villages, not individuals. However, most of the
villages divided their lands into parcels that were occupied, although not owned, by
the families that worked them.
2!1. Ley Agraria de 6 Enero 1915, in FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA 400
(1961).
24. Constituci6n de 1917, art. 27, in TENA RAMIREZ, op. cit. supra note 18, at 817,
825 (text before 1934, 1945 and 1947 amendments appears in id. at 882-89). The constitution is available in English translation, published by the Pan American Union.
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phase of the Revolution did not end until 1920-the law spelled
out the villages' rights to restitution in enough detail to make later
amendment unnecessary. The rather moderate restitution provisions
of the Agrarian Code that is now in force are, in all essentials, the
same as those of the 1915 decree.25
Arising as it did out of a violent social revolution, the law was
remarkable for what it did not do. It did not restore to the villages
the lands that were theirs at the time of the Conquest, or even at the
time of Independence. It did not upset the composiciones, which
confirmed title in outside usu;pers, except those made during the
Diaz era.26 Three kinds of transfers were declared void: (1) transfers
of village lands made in violation of the 1856 mortmain law and
other related laws; (2) concessions made by the federal government
after December I, 1876,27 that encroached on village lands; and
(3) transfers or confirmations of title made in the course of boundarymarking proceedings after December I, 1876, that encroached on village lands.28
The inadequacy of this restitution legislation was partly evident
even to its framers. From 1915 on, it was recognized that the restitution of lands to the villages would have to ~e supplemented to
some extent by grants of land obtained by expropriation, for which
compensation was to be paid. Just how much reliance would have
to be placed upon expropriation was not at first recognized, perhaps
because both the legislators and the public were generally familiar
with the history of abuse that had attended the marshalling of lands
for the great estates. It was easy to underestimate the difficulty of
undoing four hundred years of official and private connivance. In
25. C6digo Agrario de los Estados Unidos de los Mexicanos, art. 46-49.
26. The 1915 law imposes the 1876-to-date limitations period noted in the text. The
1917 constitution extended the period back to 1856 for all forms of illegal encroach•
ment. In 1934, the constitution was amended to conform with the provisions of the
1915 law, which provisions remain in force today. In fairness to those who drafted the
1915 law, it ought to be said that the number of illegal encroachments after 1876 must
have been far more significant than the number between 1856 and 1876.
27. The date marks the beginning of the Diaz era. See HERRING, A HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICA 338-53 (2d ed. 1961), for an interesting brief account of Diaz' thirty-five
year rule.
28. An exception was made for village lands that had been allotted in individual
parcels in compliance with the 1856 mortmain legislation provided that the owner had
held title for ten years and that the area of the land did not exceed fifty hectares
(about 125 acres). Simpson notes that, by 1892, the total public lands granted by way of
concession to the land companies, largely in connection with their "survey" work,
amounted to about one-fifth of the entire area of Mexico. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note
16, at 27-28.
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any case, although restitution was expected to be the main legal
weapon of the land reform, it turned out to be secondary.29
Some of the failings of the restitution legislation are apparent on
its face. Most obvious is the cut-off point of 1876, the beginning of
the Diaz regime. Even assuming the nullity of "encroaching" concessions and confirmations of title made after that date, the legislation left intact similar transactions, equally wrongful, that had
occurred earlier. Much of the villages' land had been swallowed by
the large estates in the first two centuries of Spanish rule. The
classical arguments in favor of limitations periods are unpersuasive
in this context. First, the doctrinal underpinnings for prescription
are weak. The communal lands of the villages have been, along
with other public land, exempt from claims of prescriptive right
at least since the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X.30 If it be argued that
there must be a time of repose when old wrongs are beyond redress,
then it is hard to see why the restitution legislation did not replace
the old rule of imprescriptibility with a new, general limitations
period, applicable alike to the villages and to other claimants. The
law did permit the recovery-through prolonged and uncertain
litigation31-of village lands that had been wrongfully occupied
without the assistance of the state, even though the wrong might
have been buried in the past. It impliedly carved out for protection
those wrongful occupations that were effected before 1876 with
the legal trappings of a composicion. I£ it be argued that a limitations
period is necessary in order to avoid reliance upon ancient and hardto-produce evidence, the answer is that the solution adopted fails in
29. "During the entire period from 1916 to 1944, only 6 per cent of the total land
distributed was by the method of restitution." WHEITEN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 129.
30. Ley 7a, tit. 29, Partida 3a. The Partidas were written in the middle of the
thirteenth century, but were not officially recognized as a source of law until 1348.
Although much of their content comes directly from the legislation of Justinian, they
have had great independent doctrinal significance in Spain and in Latin America. See
Lobingier, Las Siete Partidas and its Predecessors, 1 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1913); Nichols,·
Las Siete Partidas, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1932). The preamble to the 1915 law took
note of the fact that the village lands had not been subject to the operation of prescription; it was argued that the legal interests of the landowners were not invaded by the
decree of restitution because they had never acquired rights in the land restored to
the villages.
31. Zapata's Plan of Ayala referred in its sixth paragraph to "venal justice" as an
instrument of the great landowners in taking control of the village lands. See note 20
supra. His deep distrust of the judiciary has carried over into the agrarian legislation
only to the extent that expropriated landowners are disabled from seeking judicial
relief, and even that restriction no longer applies to "small property" owners. When it
is the villages that seek judicial relief (restitution), the obstacles in their path make it
easy to sympathize with Zapata.
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two ways to avoid such reliance. Not only were the villages permitted
to rely upon old evidence to prove ·wrongful encroachments, but they
were also required in every case-including those that came within
the post-1876 period of limitations-to prove their own titles. Thus
a village's rights depended upon its ability to produce a ragged and
dusty document, hundreds of years old, the authenticity of which
could only be guessed. There was a political motivation for the 1876
limitation. By purporting to undo only the transactions of the outgoing dictatorship, the Revolution's leaders could hope to avoid the
hostility of large landholders whose rights were more deeply rooted
in past dealings. Even that political judgment is now questionable,
but at this distance it is hard to fault the revolutionary leadership
for failing to make more sense out of the chaos that surrounded them.
Another kind of wrong that the restitution legislation did not
try to right was the sale of lands to speculators at manifestly unfair
prices. The first provision of the 1915 law nullified transfers made
in violation of the mid-nineteenth-century mortmain laws. The
effect was to denounce a number of village lands and the claims
that followed them as illegal mortmain holdings. The law did
not, however, reach cases in which the villages "voluntarily" complied with the current (pre-1910) interpretation of the mortmain
legislation by fragmenting their lands into individual parcels, which
were then purchased by speculators £Qr prices reflecting small fractions of their value. Because the original principles of the Mexican
land reform thus protected existing ownership to a degree that is
astonishing in comparison with the theories of the land reforms that
have since taken place in other quarters of the globe, it should not be
surprising that these principles came to be ignored.
The theory of restitution was a title theory, based upon rights
of ownership. But the concept of ownership as the normal form
of land tenure was a European import. Before the Conquest, only
some of the nobility held private property in land; the right to use
land was vital to the ordinary man, but he did not own it.32 Within
the villages' common lands, individuals and families might have
relatively well-defined rights of usufruct, but it would be misleading
to describe them as owners. Perhaps for this reason, as well as others
32. The nobles' land was transferable by sale or inheritance and worked by serfs or
slaves who passed with the land upon its transfer. Commoners who were neither serfs
nor slaves might hold inheritable rights of usufruct or might work the land under
contracts of tenancy. See Caso, Land Tenure Among the Ancient Mexicans, 65 AMER.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 863 (1963) (Wicke translation). Cf. CHEVALIER, LAND AND SOCIETY IN
COLONIAL MExlco 12-23 (Eustis translation, 1963).
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already noted, when it came time to secure titles from the Spanish
crown, many villages failed to recognize the significance of documents of title:
"Some of them were too remote from contact with Spanish
officials to make any attempt toward reforming their land
system [i.e., confirming their titles]; some were not yet sufficiently advanced in culture to appreciate the need of proper
titles for their holdings. These unrecognized towns or loosely
organized settlements continued to occupy their lands (when
not absorbed into Spanish properties) during the colonial
period and after the establishment of the republic. In fact,
many such settlements exist today . . . , holding their lands
collectively and alloting them to members of the village, without titles of any kind save the rights established by occupancy
or the testimony of chiefs and neighbors." 33
Thus, the trouble with the restitution theory was that it was not
possible for most of the villages to prove their titles to the satisfaction of judges.34 As a legal mechanism for effecting land reform,
restitution was a failure.
It would, nonetheless, be a mistake to write off the restitution
theory as unimportant. It is true that not many villages recovered
their lands in actions for restitution; instead, the lands were taken
from the great estates by expropriation and were granted to the villages. While the 1915 law had seemingly added the expropriationand-grant device as an afterthought, the 1917 constitution was interpreted to place the grant program upon an equal footing with
restitution. Still, compensation was to be made in cases of grant,
and the villages were to pay for the granted lands in installments that
would be applied to the retirement of agrarian bonds issued as
compensation to the landowners.35 That ultimately the villages did
not pay and the landowners largely went uncompensated36 was not
simply attributable to the new political force the villages found. In
the background was the theory of restitution, giving rise to claims
ll!l. McBRIDE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 125.
ll4. The history of one village's unsuccessful efforts to produce title documents is
recounted in SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 465-66. There are parallels in the experience of some of our own Indian tribes:
"[Tribal lawyers] cautioned that rejection of [the federal government's offer of
settlement] might lead to lengthy litigation that could deprive many living Indians
of any share in the settlement, and might result in no award at all.
"In a lawsuit, the lawyers said, the now widely dispersed Indians would have
difficulty furnishing the requisite legal proof that their forebears a century ago
occupied specific tracts under tribal organization." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 29,
col. 8.
ll5. See SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 218-19.
ll6. See FLORES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 324-45.
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of the most traditional kind-claims that might properly be recognized, even though they could not be substantiated by records and
proceedings in the usual European manner. This is not to say that
there was no legitimate or legal alternative to recognizing and enforcing the villages' claims; the particular confiscatory solutions
into which the Mexican Revolution fell were not compelled by positive law87 nor by some abstract "Justice." But one should not condemn those solutions out of hand as immoral or as lacking any basis in
equity or legitimacy38 unless he is also prepared to deny the legitimacy of the villages' claims to restitution.
II.

CONFISCATION IN DISGUISE: DEFERRED COMPENSATION

Some Latin-American land reform laws provide immediate payment in cash for expropriated land, 39 and, while no such law expressly requires payment of the land's market value, statements concerning value or price are sometimes interpreted as referring to the
market price.40 More typically, however, the expropriating agency
37. In an opinion that is both wistful and eloquent, Mr. Justice Jackson points up
the futility of judicial remedies to right the wrongs done by white men to Indians a
century ago. The opinion recognizes, however, that there are equities that are beyond
enforcement in court which nonetheless deserve recognition: "Whatever survives is a
moral obligation resting on the descendants of the whites to do for the descendants of
the Indians what in the conditions of this twentieth century is the decent thing."
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, !154, 355 (1945)
(concurring opinion).
!18. Two expressions of this kind, mined from the rich lode of the Congressional
Record, are 84 CONG. R.Ec. 3805 (Remarks of Hon. Hamilton Fish, April 4, 1939)
("robbery''); 86 id. at 5624-26 (Remarks of Hon. Dewey Short, May 6, 1940) f'theft,"
"piracy''). The main theme of the discussions here cited was the expropriation of
North American interests.
39. E.g., Honduras, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 52, Decreto No. 2, Sept. 29, 1962,
La Gaceta No. 17,843, Dec. 5, 1962, p. I; Panama, C6digo Agrario, Sept. 21, 1962, art.
45. The Honduran law has been translated into English in the series on Food and
Agricultural Legislation of the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization;
hereinafter, these translations will be noted: (FAO translation), and each basic reform
law will be noted after the first reference only by the country and the article, as,
Honduras, art. 52.
40. The Colombian law was so interpreted before its adoption. See L6pez Michelsen, Hacia una 'flerdadera Reforma Agraria que Complete la "Revolucion en Marcha,"
in TIERRA: 10 ENSAYOS SoBRE LA REFORMA AGRAIUA EN COLOMBIA 85, 96-99 (1962);
Lleras Restrepo, Estructura de la Reforma Agraria, in id. at 11, 71. The general reference to valuation, which does not specify market value, is in Colombia, Ley No. 1!15
Sobre Reforma Social Agraria, art. 61, Dec. 13, 1961, Diario Oficial No. 30691, Dec. 20,
1961, p. 801 (FAO translation). Seven months after the adoption of the law, an executive decree limited the appraisers to values not exceeding 130% of the assessed tax
valuation for the preceding year. Decree 1904 of 1962, art. 1. The use of this source for
valuation, discussed in section III, infra, had been proposed by some writers on the
basis of a 1959 colonization law. See MORALES BENITEZ, REFORMA AGRARIA-COLOMBIA
CAMPESINA 269-70, 275 (1962). An experienced North American observer calls this valuation provision "perhaps the strongest one of the whole body of new legislation • • • ,"
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is authorized to defer payment (often by giving compensation in
the form of agrarian bonds) and to consider factors other than market
value in evaluating the land. By traditional North American constitutional standards, either of these practices would violate requirements of just compensation.41 But, in view of the state of underdevelopment in which even the most advanced Latin-American
countries find themselves, strict application of a standard of full,
prompt, and effective payment would require the abandonment of
a land reform.42 Laws that purport to require such compensation
cannot be taken at face value: if the government intends to comply
with such a requirement, it does not intend more than a piecemeal
reform; if it intends to create a general nationwide reform, then the
statutory requirement will have to be modified or violated.
The extent to which deferment of compensation is confiscatory
depends upon factors that go beyond those to be found in the standard accountant's tables: the length of the period of deferment, the
rate of interest paid on the deferred obligation, and the going
interest rate in the money market. In a time of continuing rapid
inflation, a deferment of compensation for only a few years may
amount to near-complete confiscation, even if the bonds that are
given are made tax-exempt.43 It is possible to reduce the effect of
inflation on compensation awards by providing for periodic readjustments of the amounts due, tying compensation payments to a
cost-of-living index44 or even to some constant value measured by
a commodity such as coffee or sugar.45 But only rarely will the deHIRSCHMAN, JOURNEYS TOWARD PROGRESS 152 (1963). The landowners evidently agreed,
for the rule was changed in 1963 to permit an owner to estimate a new valuation for
future land tax purposes, which new valuation is also to be used in determining his
land's value in the event of expropriation. Owners of rural land that exceeds one
hundred hectares in area or twenty thousand Colombian pesos in value on tax registry
books are required to make such estimates every two years; if they fail to do so, they
are presumed to accept the existing valuation for expropriation purposes. An excessive
valuation (over market value) is not binding on the acquiring agency, but the new
scheme avoids the confiscatory feature of the 1962 regulation. Decreto No. 2895, Nov.
26, 1963; Decreto No. 181, Feb. 1, 1964.
41. 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 8.2, 8.6 (3d ed., Sackman, 1950).
42. See text at note 122 infra.
43. E.g., Colombia, art. 75: "Both the capital and the interest shall be free of all
national, departmental and municipal tax other than income tax and other taxes
assimilated thereto"; Honduras, art. 66: "The bonds ••• shall be exempt from payment of income tax •••"; Peru, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 230 (1964), La Prensa,
Lima, May 23, 1964, pp. 11-14 (both bonds and interest free from all taxes).
44. The Chilean constitution, recently amended to permit deferred compensation,
now provides for "a system of annual readjustment of the balance of the compensation,
with the object of maintaining its value." Ley No. 15295, Diario Oficial, Oct. 8, 1963.
Cf. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 772 (1963).
45. The land reforms in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea tied their deferred pay-
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£erred payments bear interest at a rate that approximates the high
rates now standard in Latin America.46 (If high interest rates are
simply a function of expected inflation, there is less need to match
the market rate when the principal sum is protected against a fall in
the value of money.)
Not all deferments of compensation are equally confiscatory.
Some agrarian bonds may be used at face value to pay taxes or other
obligations to the government.47 Some bear very low interest, while
others bear interest at the market rate.48 Some are issued for longer
terms than others.49 Finally, the proportion of cash payments to
bonds may vary.50 The standards by which these various factors are
adjusted all illustrate a single principle: the closer the ownership of
the expropriated land comes to fulfilling its social function, tsi by
producing well and by treating the agricultural labor force fairly,
the less confiscatory will be the taking.ts2 In addition, the extent of
deferment of compensation may be roughly proportional to the size
and value of the expropriated land.tss
ments to the expropriated landowners to the price of rice or other commodities. A
description of the Korean case appears in Bunce, Financial Aspects of Land Reform in
the Far East, in LAND TENURE 481, 485-86 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956). Cf. Mallory,
The Land Problem in the Americas, 43 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 815, 821 (1960) (references
to Taiwan reforms). [For recent comment on certain Asian reforms, see Ladejinsky,
Agrarian Reform in Asia, 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 445 (1964).] In Colombia, it has not been
unusual for private borrowers to give "coffee mortgages," that is, to agree to adjust
their future payments to the price of coffee. In such a case it should be noted that the
risks of the commodity market are added to those of inflation.
46. When inflation runs unchecked, interest rates also reach very high levels. The
current rate in Brazil, for example, is upwards of forty per cent. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
5, 1963, p. 13, col. 1.
47. E.g., Colombia, art. 78 (payment for parcels bought in consolidation or colonization programs). Cf. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 227 (Mexico: tax and other payments); Peru, art. 235 (permitting the use of agrarian bonds to pay taxes in the year in
which the bonds are redeemable).
48. Venezuela, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 174, March 5, 1960, Gaceta Oficial
No. 611 Extraordinario, March 19, 1960, p. 1 (FAO translation); Colombia, art. 75 (both
differentiating among various classes of bonds).
49. Ibid.
50. Venezuela, arts. 33, 178; Colombia, art. 75; Peru, art. 233.
51. See section IV infra.
52. Venezuela, arts. 27, 33, 174; Colombia, art. 62.
53. Venezuela, art. 178; Colombia, art. 62. As these notes suggest, the Venezuelan
and Colombian laws have done more to differentiate among the types of payment made
to various expropriated owners than have the laws of other countries. Of course the
interest rates, periods of deferment, proportions of cash payments, etc., vary from
country to country, as do degrees of faithfulness of the government to the law's provisions. In Mexico, for example, only a small fraction of the landowners received even
the authorized agrarian bonds. FLORES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 324-36. In Bolivia,
mortgage bonds (two per cent, twenty-five year terms) are authorized. Decreto Ley No.
03464 de Reforma Agraria, arts. 156-57, Aug. 2, 1953. (FAO translation.) However, the
bonds have not even been printed, and there is no present intention to issue bonds to
any of the expropriated owners; "this phase of the land reform has been virtually
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Transferability of the right to receive deferred compensation
payments has also been limited rather strictly. The most favored
classes of obligations, whether or not they take the form of bonds,
are freely transferable,54 being limited in their marketability only
by such standard market considerations as their rates of interest. In
most cases of expropriation, however, the obligations of the government either are not transferable at all or are transferable only on
condition that their proceeds be invested in certain specified sectors
of the economy. 55 The main purpose of these limitations on transferability seems to be to avoid the inflationary tendency created by
issuing a kind of second-class currency. 5 6 Allowing the transfer of
agrarian bonds for specified investment purposes does not change
the nature of the government's obligation. If, however, the government permits an acceleration of payment on condition that the payment be invested in a certain way, the government in a sense
becomes an investor for the benefit of the bondholder.
Following Mexico's lead, a number of the Latin-American countries have made express provision in their constitutions for the
deferment of their land-reform compensation payments.57 In fact,
ignored to date." Heath, Successes and Shortcomings of Agrarian Reform in Bolivia
in THE PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA 16, 19 (Discussion Paper 2, Univ. of
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1963). Cf. Flores, Land Reform in Bolivia, 30 LAND
EcoNOMICS 112 (1954); Flores, La Reforma Agraria en Bolivia, 20 EL TRIMESTRE EcoNOMICO 480 (1953).
54. The class "C" bonds in Venezuela (art. 174), and the class "A" bonds in Colombia (art. 62).
55. An example of the latter feature is in Venezuela, art. 174: the less favored
classes of bonds ("A" and "B") may be used to secure loans from official financial
institutions "for agricultural or industrial purposes ••••" Otherwise these bonds are
not transferable. In Peru, art. 236, agrarian bonds are acceptable as security for loans
up to fifty, sixty-five or eighty per cent of their face value, depending upon the class
of bonds; the loans are authorized for government banks, and no restriction is placed
on their purposes, which are presumably to be evaluated in accordance with the banks'
normal lending policies.
56. See Galbraith &: Morton, Problems of Financing Land Distribution, in LAND
T.ENURE 492, 496-97 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956).
57. The draftsmen of the 1917 constitution of Mexico deliberately substituted the
expression "by means of compensation" (mediante indemnizacion) for the existing
language of art. 27, "with previous compensation" (Previa indemnizacion); in addition, the new article expressly recognized the agrarian debt. The recent amendment to
the Chilean constitution (see note 44 supra) specifies a maximum period of deferment
of fifteen years. Cf. Venezuela, Constitution of 1961, art. 101 (deferment "for a determined time" or payment in bonds "with sufficient guarantee'). In Cuba, the land
reform law was issued by decree as an amendment to the constitution. See Cuba, Ley
de Reforma Agraria, "final additional provision," June 3, 1959; CuBA AND THE RuLE
OF LAw 98-99 (Int'! Comm'n of Jurists 1962). The most recent constitution to be
amended for this purpose is that of Brazil; the Congress passed, by an overwhelming
vote, an amendment expressly permitting payment in long-term bonds for land expropriated in the revolutionary government's land reform. See Kent, Farm Reforms for
Brazilians, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7, 1964, p. 8, col. 4.
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the only country in which the constitutionality of a deferred compensation scheme is open to question is Colombia, where the constitution, in relevant part, provides:
"For reasons of public utility or social interest, defined by the
legislative power, there may be expropriation, by means of
judicial decision and prior compensation.
"Nevertheless, the legislative power, for reasons of equity, shall
have the power to determine those cases in which there shall be
no compensation, by means of the favorable vote of an absolute
majority of the members of both Houses." 58
Some opposition legislators on the political left argued that, if the
Congress failed to make a declaration of "equity" under the latter
paragraph and failed to adopt the land reform law by a two-thirds
vote, the supreme court might hold the deferred compensation provisions of the law invalid.59 That view was opposed by members of
the Conservative Party, some of whom, in the face of the quoted
constitutional language, took the position that the constitution did
not authorize any deferment of compensation.60 The view which
prevailed was that, since the constitution authorized the withholding of some compensation under proper circumstances, "the greater
include[d] the lesser power," and the Congress was free to provide
for compensation in agrarian bonds. 61 But this reasoning ignores
the plain no-compensation language of the constitution; while it
is perfectly acceptable to argue that there is no necessity for a
purely formal declaration of any reasons of equity, the two-thirds
vote requirement is not a technicality and seems indispensable.

III.

DEBATABLE CONFISCATION:

THE

DILUTION OF MARKET VALUE

Most Latin-American constitutions do not specify market value
as the required basis for just compensation for expropriated prop58. Colombia, Constitution of 1936, as confirmed by plebiscite of 1957, art. 30.
59. L6pez Michelsen, supra note 40, at 93-94.
60. Tovar Concha, La Tesis Conseruadora Sobre Propiedad, in TIERRA: 10 ENSAYos
SoBRE LA llEFORMA AcRARlA EN CoLOMBlA 235, 242-43 (1962). Other conservatives simply
agreed with L6pez Michelsen on the need for a two-thirds vote; e.g., G6mez Hurtado,
El Autentico Contenido de Una Reforma Agraria, in id. at 169, 184-85, which argues
that a previous vote to dispense with the two-thirds rule in cases of "social" legislation
did not cover most of the law's provisions. This emergency legislation, the constitutionality of which is itself questionable, expired in December 1961; the land reform
law was rushed to passage just before the deadline. See HIRSCHMAN, op. dt. supra note
40, at 144, suggesting also that the combination of right and left opposition could have
defeated a two-thirds vote.
61. Lleras Restrepo, supra note 40, at 64.
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erty.62 Taking advantage of these constitutional ambiguities, the
existing land reform legislation tends to list market value as only
one of a series of factors that may be considered in fixing compensation, along with declared tax valuations and capitalized-income
values.
As in the United States, Latin-American tax registries normally
list land at a valuation well below its market value. Some supporters
argue, upon frankly redistributive grounds, for tax valuation as the
basis for compensation: this is one way to confiscate, and confiscation
is needed if there is to be a reform. 63 Another obvious argument is
that the landowners have been paying property taxes determined
by using the low base, and, therefore, ought not to complain if
other dealings with the government are also based upon their own
low declarations.64 The trouble with this second argument is that
all property in the nation may equally be undervalued and property
tax rates calculated with the universal understatement of values
in mind; it is not fair to single out the expropriated landowners for
punishment when their practice may not have been regarded as
wrongful and when it may have been common to all property
owners.
A better argument would be that abandonment of market value
is not confiscatory in a context in which the market-such as it is
-is influenced by factors that do not deserve legislative recognition.
Principal among those factors is the use of land as a defense against
inflation. In the face of continuing deterioration of the currency,
many who want to protect their savings buy land, using it as a
"money box." 65 If there is no real land market apart from this kind
62. Typically the constitutions require "previous" or "previous and just" compensation. E.g., Colombia, Constitution of 1886, as amended through 1957, art. 30; Brazil,
Constitution of 1946, art. 141(16); Bolivia, Constitution of 1945, art. 17. Similar language in our own state and federal constitutions has been held to require payment of
"market value.'' But see HAAR, LANo-UsE PLANNING 470-505 (1959), for an exploration
of the complexities hidden in that simple phrase. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: Thirty years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP.
CT, REv. 63, 90-105.
63. See letter of Fr. Gonzalo Arroyo, in MoRALES BENITEZ, op. cit. supra note 40,
at 275.
64. Ibid; cf. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 225-26. The Chilean reform law
achieve& a neat twist on this theory. If an owner resists the administrative valuation of
his land and if for any reason the expropriation is later abandoned, then for all tax
purposes in the future the land's value may be modified upward to the level of the
owner's claim. Ley de Reform.a Agraria, art. 32, No. 15,020, Nov. 15, 1962, Diario Oficial
No. 25, 403, Nov. 27, 1962, p. 2501 (FAO translation).
65. See L6pez Michelsen, supra note 40, at 97.
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of speculation,66 land prices will not reflect land's utility as a factor
of production.
The abandonment of market value as the standard for fair compensation does not necessarily require its replacement with the tax
registry value of the land. A more satisfactory standard might be a
capitalization of the land's income. Since much of the expropriated
land has been cultivated non-intensively, 67 the use of historical income figures would not produce a valuation that matched the value
of the land for the productive process; this could only be obtained
by the capitalization of the land's potential net_ income, assuming
the application of labor and other variable production factors to an
extent that might realistically be expected of a conscientious manager. Despite the fact that using hypothetical income figures of this
kind might result in a "truer" valuation in economic terms, however, there is a certain justice in using the income or product that
the owner has in fact produced, just as there is in using his own
property tax declarations. If this be confiscation, it can be argued
that the owner has asked for it.
No doubt all of these considerations have had their influence
in the drafting of those land reform laws that dilute the market
value standard.68 "Value," like any other word, ought to be defined
in the light of the purposes of the legislation; in this case,1 those
purposes are the purposes that motivate the land reform. The history of the landowner's minimal contributions to the society,
whether they have taken the form of low taxes, or an inadequate
production, or even the abuse of the agricultural labor force, cannot properly be ignored when the issue is the landowner's just
desert. To call this kind of valuation confiscatory is to assume the
conclusion, even though the assumption be cloaked in the rhetoric
of market value.
Who makes the valuation may be as important as the standards
prescribed for determining the amount. In every case, the administrators of the land reform are charged with making at least a pre66. See text accompanying notes 88 &: 89 infra. Where there are similar artificial
influences on market value, our own courts also may use other measures of just compensation. See JAHR, LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION AND PROCEDURE 102-15
(1953).
67. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
68. Venezuela, art. 25 (production history, assessed value, market); Costa Rica, Ley
No. 2825 de Tierras y Colonizaci6n, art. 127, Oct. 14, 1961, La Gaceta No. 242, Oct. 25,
1961, p. 4085 (FAQ translation) (upper limit: assessed value); Cuba 29, 30 (assessed
value plus improvements); Peru, art. 75 (recent declared value for tax purposes, potential income, and expert assessment).
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liminary valuation. Review of the administrative determination by
an ordinary court or by a specially established agency such as an
arbitration board is regularly provided.69 The Venezuelan experience suggests that reviewing judges have somewhat less hesitancy to
substitute their own judgment when the question is the value of
expropriated land than they do when the issue is the land's "affectability" (eligibility) for expropriation.70 Independence of the reviewing body is plainly desirable but has always been difficult
to achieve in Latin America. Zapata's Plan of Ayala, the document
which served as t]:ie manifesto for the agrarian movement in the
Mexican Revolution, noted the part that "venal justice" (i.e.,
corrupt judges) had played in the despoilment of the village lands.'ll
Corruption tends not to be the most serious problem in the context
of a land reform; the major threat is that judges will be under great
political pressure to give their support to the reform and it will
become hard to distinguish between that support and support for
the position of the executive branch in a particular case. In Bolivia,
many an "agrarian judge" 72 has been a law student; but, however
conscientious the judge, it may be asking too much to expect him
to make an independent evaluation of the lawfulness of a decree
signed by the President of the Republic.
The theory of restitution offers an explanation for the uncompensated taking of land that avoids frank recognition of the fact
that the land is being confiscated. The same kind of anticipatory
denial of the charge of confiscation is implicit in the adoption of
schemes of deferred and reduced-value compensation. Since all of
these legislative devices do result in uncompensated taking of land,
the legitimacy of the takings must rest upon something more substantial than the pretense that confiscation is not involved. The more
candid arguments in justification of confiscatory takings go directly
to the function that land ownership performs in Latin-American
society.
69. E.g., Chile, art. 26 (special court); Honduras, art. 52 (Comptroller General);
Colombia, art. 61 (three experts: one appointed by the owner, one by the Land Reform
Institute, and one by a government geographical institute; if an objection to the
arbitrator's finding is upheld by a court, then three more experts are appointed in the
same manner and their decision is final); Cuba, Act No. 588 (regulating expropriation),
art. 15, Oct. 7, 1959, Gaceta Oficial No. 191, Oct. 9, 1959, p. 22, 740 (FAQ translation)
(arbitration); Venezuela, art. 36 (arbitration, subject to judicial review).
70. Interview with Dr. Ing. Bruno Salazar Figueroa, Institute Agrario Nacional,
Caracas, Venezuela, March 12, 1963.
71, See note 31 supra.
72. The post is established by art. 166 of the Bolivian reform law.
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"THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF OWNERSHIP"

With all of the passion of fresh discovery, Latin-American reformers have taken to the idea that private ownership implies a
degree of social obligation. Duguit's old phrase, "the social function
of ownership," 78 has in fact been written into several land reform
laws. The idea that property should have to be justified by reference
to its social function comes naturally to North American lawyers,
who have subjected legal relations to the same kind of scrutiny for
at least the past two generations. What is surprising, given the conditions of Latin-American society during the same period, is that
similar analysis has taken so long to be accepted in those countries.
The tenacity of the civilian traditions against restrictions upon
ownership perhaps can be explained as a result of the way most
Latin-American lawyers have been trained. 74 There the law, at
least as it is expressed in the principal codes, is normally expounded
and analyzed, even memorized by students, as a kind of holy abstraction. Basic legal institutions are conceived to be static rather than
dynamic; a discussion of social needs and a discussion of the meaning of the Civil Code, for example, would be kept in separate analytical compartments. Of course this is a caricature, exaggerated for
emphasis, but the exaggeration is not too great.75 In such an atmosphere, it has been easy for nineteenth-century protections of individual economic freedom to become frozen into law and, equally
important, frozen into both professional and popular ideas concerning the nature of private ownership. 76
73. See DuGUIT, I.Es TRANSFORMATIONS GENERAi.ES DU DROIT PRIVE (1912), translated
by Register and excerpted in RATIONAL BAStS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 315, 317-23 (Wigmore and Kocourek ed. 1923); cf. 2 ELY, PROPERTY AND CoNTRAcr IN THEIR RELATION TO
THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 627-42 (1914).
'
74. See generally Katz, Report of a Visit to Mexico and South America, July 8-September 5, 1961, to the Committee on Higher Education in the American Republics,
1961.
75. Partly as a result of the activity of CHEAR (see note 74 supra), important, but
largely unsuccessful, efforts for improvement were recently made in two of Latin
America's best universities, the University of Sao Paulo and the University of Chile. Of
course many individual teachers are not guilty of the kind of barren instruction here
described; but they are, unhappily, still a small minority.
76. The Latin-American civil codes, largely taken from the Code Napoleon, recognize
the limitation of "abuse of right," which, in its applications to property, roughly
parallels the common-law maxim sic utere tuo. But it is important to remember that
this limitation, like others, is regarded as an exception to the more general civilian
tendency opposing restrictions on private ownership. Thus, a leading Argentine writer
feels compelled to explain something that English or North American lawyers
would never have doubted: that property is not really absolute. 8 SALVAT, TRATADO DE
DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO 362-67 (3d ed. 1946) (citing DUGUIT, op. cit. supra note 73),

December 1964]

The Uses of Confiscation

347

A. Legislative Standards for Expropriation
'While similar performance of ~ocial functions might, with equal
reason, be demanded of other property interests, at the present time
in Latin America, talk of this kind has been largely restricted to
ownership of rural land. There are few serious proposals for the
expropriation of factories, corporate shares, or bank accounts. 77 In
identifying those functions that the ownership of rural land ought
to perform, the usual practice has been for the draftsmen of reform
legislation to cast their definition negatively: ownership fulfills its
social function when it avoids creating certain anti-social conditions.
The legislative catalogue of such conditions is thus an imperfect
mirror image of a near-feudal society that is at once economically
drowsy and politically restless. The statutory definitions of the social
function concentrate on two fundamental features of the hacienda
society: the failure to cultivate land adequately and the injustices attendant upon the indirect exploitation of land through tenant
farmers, sharecroppers, and the like. Any genuine effort to remedy
these ills necessarily implies an attempt to destroy the system, and
the draftsmen of land reform legislation know it.
The classical hacienda is not run for a profit; rather, it is run
as a country estate for an owner who is usually absent. "The hacienda is not a business"; 78 it is a symbol of wealth and power.79
More than that, it is, or aims to be, a self-contained community,
77. It is true that some Latin-American governments have recently begun to make
noises about tax reforms; others have both threatened and carried out nationalization
programs, principally directed at public utilities. The generalization in the text stands,
however. One exception that may come to be regretted is the Cuban "urban reform,"
which confiscated landlords' property, particularly apartment housing, for the benefit
of their tenants. Bearing in mind the experience of Mexico, which left urban holdings
intact (see text at note 127 infra), it has been suggested that the Cuban government
acted hastily in (a) failing to maintain an urban land base for capital formation, and
(b) driving large numbers of trained middle-class and professional people into exile,
instead of trying to win their loyalty as did the Mexican government. The point is
tentatively made in FLORES, REFoRMA AGRARIA EN MEx1co 458-59 (Univ. of Chile
mimeo 1962).
78. MOLINA ENRIQUEZ, Los GRANDES PROBLEMAS NACIONALES 90 (1909). The comments
that follow in the text describe the classical hacienda, not the plantations that raise
cash crops for export. As Tannenbaum remarks, the plantation is more properly conceived as a rural industry, rather than a traditional agricultural undertaking, at least
when reform questions are being considered. TANNENBAUM, TEN KEYs TO LATIN
AMERICA 77-94 (1962). For a discussion of one land reform in the context of a plantation economy, see Note, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an Instructive
Experiment, 73 YALE L.J. 334 (1963).
79. The hacienda has been described very well by the writers often cited in these
notes: McBride, Simpson and Whetten. An excellent short description is contained in
TANNENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 78, at 5. Concerning the inefficiency of absentee
ownership, see SCHULTZ, TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE 118-22 (1964).
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able to provide its own needs without recourse to the money economy. It neither produces primarily for the market nor demands
things that can be obtained only for cash from the outside. In order
to avoid paying cash wages, the hacienda permits some laborers to
occupy dwellings and small parcels of land. In return, these workers
and their families must furnish a specified number of days of work
each week or month. Some cash wages are mythically paid, but they
usually assume the form of credits on the books of the hacienda's
store; in fact, the labor force lives at a subsistence level and is kept
in a form of perpetual debt slavery.80 The sharecropping system
serves the same purpose of avoiding a cash outlay for labor.
The forms of such arrangements are various, but they generally
amount to this: the landowner furnishes the land, and perhaps some
of the seed, and the sharecropper furnishes his own labor, along with
the labor of his family; the crop is divided between the owner and
the cropper, and part-often all-of the cropper's share may go to
the owner to repay advances of subsistence items. The hacienda is
large enough in extent that there is no economic motive either for
working all of its land or for cultivating intensively those lands
that are worked.
The conversion of such a regime to intensive farming, directly
managed by the owner and subject to minimum legislative standards
for wages and living conditions of the labor force, would amount
to the destruction of the hacienda. Money would be needed in large
amounts, both to satisfy the new wage regulations and to pay for
the fertilizers and other ingredients of input required for intensive
cultivation. In short, the owner would be required to operate his
lands as a commercial farm. Farm land would be valuable principally as capital for the production of income and, therefore, would
become the object of purchases and sales in a land market. (The
market for hacienda lands has long been highly restricted; haciendas
are normally inherited, occasionally acquired by marriage, but only
infrequently purchased.)
Although there are undoubtedly some undesirable features of
absentee ownership that are beyond the reach of meliorative reforms,
it is likely that Latin-American reformers would not object to a
continuation of indirect exploitation if it were possible to eliminate
80. The plight of the hacienda's workers was described in painful detail in a
famous speech by Luis Cabrera to the Chamber of Deputies on December 3, 1912. The
speech is widely reprinted: FABILA, op. cit. supra note 13, at 224; 1 SILVA HERzoc, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 267; 2 LA CUESTION DE LA TIERRA 277 (1961).
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certain abuses that are tied to the existing forms of tenure. The
worst of those evils are: insecurity, both as to the duration of the
tenancy and as to the recovery of investments in improvements
during the period of tenancy; oppressive contractual ties binding
the tenant to the landlord, who profits on the provision of input
items, such as seed and fertilizer, and on the marketing of the crop;
and lack of access to ownership. It is occasionally argued that, with
enough money and trained manpower, a determined government
(which itself has security of tenure) might solve all of these problems by regulation rather than expropriation. The hope for such a
regulatory program stems from the possibility that it might obviate
the need to give up the system of "private technical assistance and
credit" that is provided by the present tenancy structure, along
with some important marketing channels associated with landlord
middlemen, all of which would have to be replaced following a
more drastic reform. 81
In Uruguay, just such a regulatory program seems to have been
effective, and wholesale expropriations have been avoided.82 But,
certain facts make Uruguay's situation unique: its population is
highly literate, even sophisticated, by Latin-American standards;
there is relatively little population pressure on its rural land; 83 and,
probably most important, the government is stable, and it is therefore possible to assume that programs that are instituted will be
carried out, or at least given a fair try. This combination of conditions is not duplicated in any other Latin-American country, with
the possible exception of Costa Rica. Whether the reason be the
absence of trained administrators or the reformers' suspicion of
measures that they consider to be "half way," most Latin-American
land reform laws authorize the expropriation of indirectly exploited
lands as well as the regulation of agricultural tenancy arrangements.
The legislative language that makes such lands "affectable" (subject
to expropriation) ranges from the naming of particular types of
tenancy or farm labor arrangements84 to the broad inclusion of all
lands not personally worked, directed, and financed by their
81. O'BYRNE, THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAw 3, 13-14 (AID Rural Development Team Supplemental Report, 1963).
82. Uruguay, Ley de 27 Abril 1954, Diario Oficial No. 14224, May 15, 1954, p. 155-A,
modified by Ley de 22 Junio 1954, Diario Oficial No. 14227, July 19, 1954, p. 95-A
(FAO translation).
83. See .ABENSOUR, MORAL LoPEZ &: JACOBY, Los ARRENDAMIENTOS Romeos: PRINCIPIOS DE LEGISLACION 58 (FAO Legislative Series No. 58, 1957).
84. E.g., Colombia, art. 55; cf. Bolivia, art. 12.
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owners. 85 None of the definitions can be called precise, and all of
them !~ave considerable room for discretion in their administration.
A similar breadth of language attends nearly all legislative definitions of the other main aspect of the social function of ownership: the rational cultivation of land. Expropriation is authorized
when the land is "idle," or "uncultivated," or "notoriously badly
exploited."86 Almost never does a land reform law specify in greater
detail the quality or level of cultivation that will take land out of
the expropriable class.87 The complaint is made that standards that
are so vague are not standards at all, resulting in two principal unfortunate consequences: the selection of land for expropriation is
left to administrative discretion, with no effective control over the
administrator's conformance to legislative purposes, and the absence
of standards frightens away new private investment in land.88
Given the political history of Latin America, fears of administrative abuse of discretionary power cannot be called groundless. Still,
it is not immediately apparent how workable legislative definitions
of adequate cultivation could be made more precise. A number of
suggestions might be made for lending a greater degree of certainty
to the selection of land for expropriation, but not one of them is
much of an improvement:
(I) The law might list the principal factors to be considered
by the agency charged with the initial determination of affectability.
For example:
"In classifying an area of land as being inadequately farmed,
the Institute shall take the following factors into consideration:
situation in relation to large urban centers; relief; quality of
85. E.g., Venezuela, arts. 19, 20; Honduras, art. 7(a); cf. Peru, arts. 16-19.
86. Colombia, art. 55 ("uncultivated," "inadequately farmed"); Venezuela, art. 19
(failure to maintain "efficient exploitation and profitable use," "to bring usefully into
play the productive factors thereof, according to the zone in which it is located and
its special characteristics''); Honduras, art. 7 (failure "to operate efficiently"); Costa
Rica, art. 120 ("uncultivated''); Peru, art. 14 ("idle or uncultivated''); Chile, art. 15
("abandoned," or "notoriously badly exploited''). Cf. Bolivia, art. 25 ("undeveloped or
substantially under-developed'').
87. Article 29 of the Honduran law makes a slight concession in this direction,
exempting stock-raising land when it is bounded and grazing one head of cattle (or
five of sheep, etc.) for each two hectares.
88. O'BYRNE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 3-5, 10-11. "The United Fruit Co., a company which has made and is making great contributions to the economy of Louisiana
and my home city of New Orleans, has made it clear to the Government of Honduras
that it will make no new investment in Honduras should this law pass." 108 CoNG.
REc. A7959 (1962) (extension of remarks of Hon. Hale Boggs, largely devoted to a
reprint of a speech of Mr. Victor C. Folsom of the United Fruit Co.). The fate of the
Honduran law in the wake of the October 1963 "anti-Communist" military revolution
is not yet apparent.
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the soil; possibility of irrigation and reclamation; possibility of
continuous and regular use; type and intensity of fanning;
capital and labor employed on the farm; commercial value and
yield of the property and population density in the rural area
where the property is situated." 89
Such a check-list is useful, but it adds little precision to the expression "inadequately fanned," either for the purpose of limiting the
Institute's discretion or to reassure a potential agricultural investor.
(2) Lands might be classified administratively and minimum
production levels established for various types of crops according
to the classification. Although such a scheme, if coupled with a
system of administrative or judicial review of challenged classifications, might provide the necessary minimum of assurance for investors, it would be impossible to administer, at least at the outset
of any fundamental refonn. 90 Reforming governments have all they
can do to make the sort of piecemeal classifications that are required
in each case of expropriation resulting from "inadequate" cultivation. 91 Also, a classification scheme that sought to cover any substantial part of a country's private land would not simply be expensive;
it might be impossible to make the classification because of a personnel shortage, which is likely to continue well beyond the initial
phases of expropriation and distribution of land.
(3) Standards that are phrased in terms of "average" levels of
productivity92 are equally unspecific, unless account is also taken
89. Colombia, art. 56. Honduras, art. 56 is copied from the Columbian provision.
90. The expression "fundamental" is used to distinguish redistributive reforms
from reforms such as colonization, tenancy regulation, and the like, which do not
involve significant changes in the pattern of distribution of agricultural income. Such
a reform, if it is to be carried out at all, had better be done fairly rapidly; if reform
talk goes on for a long time, agricultural investment is apt to fall just because of the
uncertainty of the owners' position. The latter point is made frequently by Dr.
Edmundo Flores, who served with FAO as an adviser to the Bolivian government;
his advice was followed. See Flores, Land Reform in Bolivia: An Informal Discussion,
in THE PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA 4 (Univ. of Wisconsin Land Tenure
Center Discussion Paper 2, 1963). A fundamental reform that is rapidly accomplished
will make its distributions before an "adequate" administrative staff can be a~embled,
let alone trained.
91. Nonetheless, many of the reform laws make provision for national cadastres,
surveys, and registers. E.g., Honduras, arts. 207-16; Venezuela, arts. 166-71, 198, 203-04.
The Venezuelan classification is still far from complete; lands are classified whenever
they are the subject of expropriation proceedings, and the classifications are used in
determining whether the ownership is fulfilling its social function. For the record in
one such case, see !NsrlTOTO AGRARIO NACIONAL, Au:GACION y PREUBA DE LA FuNCION
SocIAL (1962) (references to classification in the judge's opinion at 88-89).
92. See Cuba, art. 2 (exemption for sugar plantations producing at least fifty per
cent over the national average yield); Chile, art. 15 ("levels below those of normal
productivity''); cf. the 1960 progressive tax law of the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, which
exempted "rationally cultivated" land on which the workers were supplied with
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of the character of the soil and other factors such as those noted in
paragraph (I) of this list. Such standards will also fail to achieve the
objective of radically increasing production unless they require
production in multiples of the average levels of preceding years;
if the hacienda economy has not produced well, it will not do to
accept past production levels as models for the future. However,
at the same time, there is an obvious unfairness in selecting a previously productive estate for expropriation just because it cannot
double or treble its own past successes. These difficulties suggest that
a standard based upon average production is workable only when
the land in question has been classified and its present production
is measured against averages for its class; thus, the administrative
difficulties associated with classification still are not avoided.
(4) In Mexico, since the adoption of the Aleman administration's
1947 amendments to the constitution and the Agrarian Code, it
has been possible for holders of exempt small properties93 to obtain
from the government certificates of non-affectability, immunizing
them from expropriation and entitling them to judicial protection
in the event of administrative disregard of their immunity.94 It has
been tentatively suggested that a similar immunity might be given
to land that is fulfilling its social function, principally for the purpose of making the land safe for investment.95 But, while measurements of land area tend to stay the same, the adequacy of cultivation of the land is less constant. And once a system of periodic
inspection is added, along with the possibility of revocation of the
immunity, much of the reason for a certificate of non-affectability
is lost. From the investor's viewpoint, there is little security in an
immunity that can be withdrawn if some official makes a new
certain minimum facilities, on which soil conservation measures were taken, etc. The
regulations defined "rational cultivation" in terms of above-average production. Decree
No. 38,828, art. 18, § 1, April 14, 1961. See note 134 infra.
Under the new Peruvian law (arts. 23, 31, 34), a landowner may increase the area
which he reserves from expropriation if his exploitation of the land has exceeded
by a specified percentage (25% or 30%) the average per-hectare figures in his region
or valley in four out of the following five departments: (a) production; (b) capital
investment; (c) labor costs, including housing and other "indirect" wage equivalents;
(d) taxes paid; and (e) stimulation of agricultural development. The latter element is
not specifically defined.
93. Up to one hundred hectares of irrigated land, or correspondingly larger parcels
of land that is less favored, may be immunized. Each member of a family may be a
small property owner, entitled to a certificate; the result is that there are many large
holdings in Mexicq that are exempt from affectability.
94. Mexico, Constitution of 1917, art. 27, paras. XIV, XV. See also Reglamento de
Inafectabilidad Agricola y Ganadera, Aug. 14, 1947, Diario Oficial, Aug. 16, 1947.
95. O'BYRNE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 3.
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determination that the cultivation of the land fails to meet the
statutory standard, which is itself susceptible to more than one interpretation. A minimum term for immunity that would be acceptable
to potential investors (for example, five years), however, would
probably be regarded as too long by a reforming government.
Although there is not much that can be done to improve upon
the rather vague statutory standards of adequate cultivation, it might
still be possible to secure an increased measure of certainty, or at
least consistency, by providing for review of determinations of
affectability, either at a higher level of administration96 or in court.
However, there should be no illusions about the supposed advantages of judicial review. Those advantages all rest upon assumptions
concerning the judiciary's independence that simply are not valid in
the Latin-American context. Even when an individual judge wishes
to be independent, there is an undeniable tendency to rely upon
the technical evaluations of the government's agronomists, who are
apt to be the only experts consulted in an expropriation proceeding.97 And, when the legislative standards are so broad, the modest
goal of consistency of treatment is difficult even for judges to achieve.
Despite those serious problems, some form of higher-level administrative review of affectability determinations is justified. Administrators who know that their determinations will be examined
(if only by other administrators) probably will try harder to follow
the statutory standards, even if those standards are less than precise.
Furthermore, the reviewing officer or board will construct over a
period of time a body of knowledge or experience that is concentrated upon the application of the statutory standards. Officials
who make the initial determinations of affectability, however, are
prevented from concentrating their attention upon the legal issues
in such cases, because in every case of expropriation their responsibility extends to a great number of other functions. Nonetheless,
since the cost of administrative review is relatively low, any government undertaking a land reform should not fail to secure whatever
degree of concentrated attention and consistency such a review might
afford.
Conscientiously applied, the "social function" standard would
96. Radical reformers in Mexico bemoan the fact that the normal expropriation
procedure requires the concurrence of both the state governor and the president of
the Republic. More review means more opportunity for the exercise of political
influence to delay or entirely defeat a distribution.
97. The Venezuelan case referred to in note 91 supra is a good illustration of the
government's monopoly on expertise.
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not reach most North-American land investments. This country's
investors have not put their money in the hacienda system, but,
instead, have financed commercial agriculture. Typically, plantation
products-principally bananas and sugar-are raised for export.98
These enterprises generally cannot be criticized on grounds of economic inefficiency; they are generally highly efficient, producing a
good profit on their investment.99 Land reform, conceived as the
division of large estates into small ones, makes no sense in such a
context. A family simply could not efficiently operate its share of a
banana plantation. Thus, the inevitable result of such a break-up of
plantation holdings would be a severe drop in production; and, since
these crops are often the countries' principal sources of foreign exchange, a sudden production decrease might be disastrous for the
entire economy.
There are, however, some points at which North American agricultural interests may be influenced by programs labeled "land reform." In the long run, it is probably to the advantage of a country
whose economy is dominated by one or two export products to
diversify. Just as Venezuela needs to "sow petroleum," using oil
money to lay the foundation for a more broadly-based economy, so
the Central-American countries may need to lessen their dependence on bananas and coffee.100 It may be thought wise to change
gradually a substantial portion of such a country's agriculture to the
production of crops necessary to feed a growing domestic population. In such a situation, the government may add to the content of
the "social function" test a requirement of not only intensive or
efficient farming, but also of farming the "right" crops. Although
expropriation is by no means necessary to achieve this change, it
98. United States agricultural investment in Latin America has recently been concentrated in Central America and the Caribbean. Before the Cuban confiscations,
nearly half of such investment was in Cuba, and about forty per cent was in Central
America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INVEST·
MENTS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY 148-49 (1957). United States investment in
Latin-American agriculture declined during the period 1929-1940, no doubt partly as
a result of takings of land in the Mexican land reform. Since 1940, the total value of
such direct investments has steadily increased; agricultural investment is now dwarfed,
however, by North-American investment in petroleum, mining, and manufacturing.
Id. at 111; cf. INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (OAS), FOREIGN INVEST•
MENTS IN LATIN AMERICA (1955).
99. Concerning profits, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. dt. supra note 98, at 111,
121. Even severe critics admit the economic efficiency of the foreign-owned plantations.
See FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA 279-99 (1961).
100. In the short run, a decision to make a sudden conversion to a diversified agriculture may be most unwise, as recent Cuban experience suggests.

December 1964]

The Uses of Confiscation

355

may be used as a threat, an ultimate sanction to be applied in the
event of noncompliance with the national food policy.
Beyond that long-range concern about the plantation economy,
there is the obvious and immediate concern for fair labor relations.
Agricultural companies from North America employ workers in
significant numbers.101 Whether or not it is wise policy, it surely is
not unconscionable to include in the definition of "social function"
a standard of substantial compliance with laws protecting agricultural labor. 102 A change in land tenure structures is made, not for
its own sake, but rather for the purpose of changing relations among
men. Therefore, if the hacienda system may legitimately be abolished for the purpose of redistributing agricultural income, it cannot be less legitimate to use expropriation as a threat to force a
redistribution in the form of better wages and working conditions
in the plantation setting. Objection to this by some United States
investors in Latin-American agriculture is surprising, considering
the liberality of their labor policies as those policies are described
in the "authorized" company biographies.103
Land reform thus appears not to be a serious threat to the continuation of United States agricultural investment in Latin America
so long as the "social function" test is the real test for affectability
of land.10t But, with regard to such investment, it is likely that the
reforming countries will adopt measures short of expropriation.
Just as Venezuela has taxed, rather than expropriated, North American oil investments, investors in agriculture can expect tougher
bargaining over taxes, concessions, prices, labor costs, and the like.
This kind of tightening is not fairly equated with confiscatory
takings on the Cuban model, and the tone of the complaints of
investors threatened by higher taxes and harder bargaining is more
than a little reminiscent of the rumblings about Bolshevism that
accompanied the domestic business regulation of the 1930's.105
101. North American agricultural interests employ about the same number of
persons in Latin America as do North American manufacturing companies, although
direct investment in manufacturing is about two and one-half times greater in dollar
amount. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 98, at 111, 122.
102. The term "unconscionable" is used in this connection in O'BYRNE, op. cit.
supra note 81, at 11.
103. See, e.g., MAY &: PLAZA, THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA 200-09,
243-43 (7th case study on United States Business Performance Abroad, National Planning Association, 1958).
104. In Cuba, of course, the real tests for affectability were political, and virtually
all United States interests were confiscated. See note 143 infra.
105. See Folsom, The Outlook for the Alliance for Progress-1964, 8 A.B.A. SECTION
OF INT'L AND CoMP. L. BuLL. 21 (1964).
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B. The Argument for Selective Confiscation
The "social function" test, while aimed at eliminating the
hacienda system,106 is not in itself confiscatory; it is used to make
the selection of land for expropriation, and the question of compensation is arguably separable. But, given the compensation formulas that have been adopted into the same reform legislation, almost
all expropriation for land reform purposes is at least partially
confiscatory.107 Thus, in its effect, the test used for selecting land
to be expropriated is really a test for confiscation, and its legitimacy
must be considered with that result in mind.
One doctrinal support for the principle that rural land must
fulfill a social function is the notion that the state holds the underlying title to all land. This eminent domain theory was adopted in
the Mexican Constitution:
"Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of
the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which
has had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private
persons, thereby constituting private property.'' 108
The idea is not that the state has all of the rights of ownership in
all of the land, but rather that the recognition of private rights in
land came originally from the state and properly depends for its
continuance upon the satisfaction of community needs.109 Whether
or not similar language is enacted into law, this original right theory,
or something akin to it, has had influence in a number of Latin
American countries.110
In several land reform laws, there are provisions for the "reversion" of uncultivated lands to the state.111 One arguable justification might be that the state has granted private rights in land subject to the condition that the land be cultivated; if the condition is
broken, the ownership reverts. However, there are difficulties with
106. See Honduras, art. l; Venezuela, preamble; cf. Betancourt, La Reforma
Agraria, in POSICION Y DoCTRINA 121 (1959).
107. See sections II and III supra.
108. These are the first words of article 27.
109. Two exceptionally good analyses, emphasizing that property rules are rules
for relations among men, are M. R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927), and F. S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954).
llO. The long colonial period, during which the Spanish crown consistently asserted
such rights, is surely partly responsible for much of the theory's continued authority.
Ill. E.g., Bolivia, art. 67; Colombia, ch. VII. The Colombian provision dates from
a 1936 law, which-depending upon one's point of view-was or was not effective to
improve the position of the rural poor and to decrease rural violence. For a relatively
favorable description of the law's effects, see H!RsCHMAN, op. cit. supra note 40, at
107-13.
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such reasoning: much of the vacant and uncultivated land in question has been in private hands for generations, while the state's
interest is only now asserted; furthermore, the original grants normally did not contain express conditions requiring cultivation, except in the case of grants of land in colonization programs similar
to those established by the homestead laws in the United States.
A more realistic explanation of the recent uncompensated takings
of uncultivated land is that there has been a frank acceptance of
governmental responsibility for implementing the social function
theory. The Bolivian land reform law of 1953, after declaring that
all land belongs to the nation by "original right," says: "The State
shall recognize and guarantee private agrarian property where it
serves a purpose benefiting the national community."112 An easilyderived corollary is that the state may properly impose sanctions on
uses of land that it considers anti-social. Those sanctions may stop
short of expropriation, as in the case of schemes of progressive
taxation. 118 But a more extreme economic sanction is the confiscation of those property rights that are abused.
North American law1ers, before they register shock, should
consider such features of our own law as the uncompensated condemnation of decaying slums,114 the uncompensated withdrawal of
public utility franchises for failure to serve the public convenience
and necessity,115 and even the uncompensated abolition of slavery.116 It is not a sufficient distinction to say that a franchise is not
112, Bolivia, art. 2.
113. See text at note 135 infra.
114. The "public nuisance" theory and its limitations are outlined in Annot., 14
A.L.R.2d 73 (1950).
115. It has to be conceded that the instances of such withdrawals are rare. The
relevant cases tend to approve the principle that franchises may be terminated "for
cause" (e.g., inadequacy of service or abandonment of the franchise), but most frequently deny the existence of the asserted cause. See cases cited in PuR DIGEST and
PuR DIGEST (N.S.) (1963) at Franchises, §§ 8, 54, 55, and at Public Utilities, § 3.
Although the Civil Aeronautics Board has the power to suspend a carrier's service,
"there has not been a substitution of one trunk carrier by another after a finding of
inadequate service." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 707 (Comm. Print 1961).
116. Before and during the Civil War, a great many proposals were made for
gradual or compensated emancipation. For a variety of such schemes, see CHILD,
AMERICANS CALLED AFRICANS 102 (1833); COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO
SLAVERY clxxi-clxxii (1858); COLEMAN, VIRGINIA SILHOUETIES, app., 54-56 (1934); liAu.,
THE Two-FOLD SLAVERY OF THE UNITED STATES (1854); OWEN, THE WRONG OF SLAVERY,
THE RIGHT OF EMANCIPATION 150-55 (1864). Lincoln's own early preference was for a
solution that was not confiscatory, and compensation was to be paid to slaveowners in
the District of Columbia. 12 STAT. 376, 538 (1862). See SELBY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE
EVOLUTION OF HIS EMANCIPATION POLICY (1909); WILSON, HISTORY OF ANTISLAVERY
MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED-STATES CONGRESSES: 1861-
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"property" or that one cannot own another man. Conclusory statements of that sort only hinder the analysis of reasons for taking
some kinds of interests without compensation while requiring compensation for other takings. Instead, the arguments in justification
of confiscation must be tested by reference to considerations that are
legislative in nature-"considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned."117 It is important to remember that the
principal "community concerned" is not our own highly developed,
broadly educated, and well fed community, but a cluster of communities ranging from underdeveloped to undeveloped, from semiliterate to illiterate, and from underfed to starving.118 In such contexts, it is surprising that traditional, Western, legal-constitutional
protections of property have survived so long.
We must begin with the goals of the men who create land reforms.119 Their basic political motive-to get and keep powercannot be denied. The political allure of confiscation as the basis
for a share-the-wealth program has not been ignored by LatinAmerican politicians. In Mexico, confiscatory land reform was a
huge political success: it stopped the fighting, and it secured the
65, at 79-91 (1865). The confiscation of property other than slaves was popular on
both sides, and followed a pattern set by similar legislation in the colonies during the
Revolutionary War. See VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27581, 335-41 (1902). After the Civil War, a presidential amnesty restored much of the
land confiscated in the South. Before that time, proposals had been made for dividing
the confiscated land among the freed slaves, in the fashion of what we should now
call a land reform. See WHmNG, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 469-78 (43d ed. 1871).
These measures have found their parallel in twentieth-century Latin America, both
in Zapata's proposal to confiscate the land of opponents of the revolution and in the
Cuban government's confiscation of property held by Batista adherents and by United
States interests. These confiscations produced so much land for the Cuban land reform
that in the first two years of the reform only twenty-five per cent of the area of land
marshalled for the reform came from the enforcement of the "basic" land reform law.
See Chonchol, Andlisis Critico de la Reforma Agraria Cubana, 30 EL TRIMESTRE Eco·
NOMICO 69, 97 (1963).
117. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
118. This description does not really fit Argentina, Uruguay, some of southern
Brazil, or important parts of Chile. Its accuracy, even for some of the relatively
advanced countries of Latin America, is supported by a few representative figures.
Literacy rates (around 1950): Brazil, 49%; Mexico, 57%; Peru, 47%; Bolivia, 32%:
Haiti, 11 %· Number of persons per doctor: Argentina, 800; Brazil, 2,500; Guatemala,
6,400; Haiti, 28,000. The figures are taken from Cabezas de Gonzalez, Diagnostico
Economico-Social de America Latina, in VISION CRISTIANA DE LA REvoLUCION EN
AMERICA LATINA at 53, 63 (1962) (special issue of MENSAJE, a Jesuit magazine of
Santiago); cf. SzuLc, THE WINDS OF REvoLUTION, ch. 2 (1963); Schaefer, Nutrition and
the Population Explosion in Latin America, in EXPLOSIVE FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA
127 (TePaske & Fisher ed. 1964).
119. See Barraclough, supra note 3.
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loyalty of the rural population to the government.120 Our inquiry,
however, is not into the popularity of confiscation, but instead into
justifications that may bear upon its legitimacy. Although the two
questions surely are not wholly separate, narrowly political arguments are often assumed to lack the moral force that our traditions
assign to other rationalizations for legislative decisions. Consequently, we must turn to social and economic justifications that
may have a validity independent of "politics."
In the long run, land reformers seek to effect a greater equality
among men. Giving rights in land to the campesinos is instrumental
. to feeding and housing them better, replacing their old attitudes of
servility with a new sense of community responsibility, giving them
a voice in the management of their lives, and giving them an incentive to educate their children. Other aims of land reformers are
to break the restrictions on economic activity that are implicit in
a hacienda society and to promote the development of the economy,
partly through increased agricultural production (with some corresponding increase in the rural sector's demand for other products)"
and partly through an improvement in the level of investment.
Those goals are obviously laudable. However, it is less obvious
that confiscation is a necessary step in their achievement. Here the
analysis must be tentative, for the evidence presently available permits little in the way of definite conclusions and even less in the way
of generalization. In the following discussion, statements are made
positively in order to avoid the exasperations induced by continual
hedging. The statements, however, should be taken as examples of
arguments in justification of confiscatory land reform, and not as
assertions of tested truth.
The only large-scale land reforms that have taken place in Latin
120. The last armed revolt in Mexico is now thirty-five years in the past. See
HERRING, A HISrORY OF LATIN AMERICA. 372 (2d ed. 1961). There are new population
pressures on the land, only partially relieved by the bracero program of temporary
jobs for Mexican migrant workers in the United States. One result has been a new
series of campesino invasions. See the open letter to the President of the Republic from
the Regional Livestock. Association of the State of Chihuahua in Excelsior, Mexico
City, June 2, 1963, p. 17-A; cf. Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, in
LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 117-20 (Hirschman ed. 1961); 15 HISPANIC
AMERICAN REPORT 789-91 (1962). Another symptom of unrest is the recent formation of
an independent-i.e., not tied to the official party-campesino organization, the Central
Campesino lndependiente, under the nominal leadership of General Cardenas, who
still symbolizes the vigorous agrarianism of the 1930's as well as an anti-yanqui position
which is probably more extreme than the General's own views. In any case, the total
agricultural production in Mexico has been growing (1952-1959) at the remarkable rate
of 7.1% per year, far outstripping growth rates in countries that have superior land
resources, such as Argentina and Chile.
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America-those of Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba-have
achieved real progress in the highly intangible area of social attitudes. The beneficiaries of the land reforms now regard themselves
as men, as citizens. They are building schools with their own labor,
electing their community leaders, and managing their affairs-all
in striking contrast to the attitudes and activities of the pre-reform
era. 121 Where the rural populations include strong indigenous elements, steps toward social equality are also steps toward racial
equality.
It is the distribution of rights in land, rather than the manner
of acquisition of the land, that apparently has produced these social
benefits. It is, therefore, necessary to defend confiscation by arguing
that distribution would not have been possible if compensation of
the landowners had been required, for, given the severe limitations
on the government's resources that inevitably accompany underdevelopment,122 the only promising source of funds for compensating the expropriated owners is the distributed land itself. The
government might exact payments from the beneficiaries of the
distribution; it might levy a tax on the land's future production;
or, it might control farm prices in such a way as to effect an indirect
tax. The obvious problem created by any such decision is that land
values-whether or not calculated by capitalizing earnings--are
likely to be high enough that their recapture, through taxes or other
periodic payments by the beneficiaries, would consume a high proportion of the income the land produces. Accordingly, although the
beneficiary would be an "owner," his net income would approximate
day wages. And, to the extent that land values might be juggled
downward for the benefit of beneficiaries who may have to pay for
the land, the owners' property would be confiscated. Thus, it is
readily seen that in a land reform the goals of compensation and
increased economic equality are, to a significant degree, inconsistent.
121. See Patch, Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting, in ADAMS, ET AL.
SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY 108, 137-51 (1960); FLORES, LAND REFORM AND
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 7 (1963). My own observations, particularly in Venezuela,
but also in Mexico, lend support to these authors' comments.
122. The one exception is Venezuela; but, even there, the competition for government revenues is keen, and it is not surprising that roads, schools, and housing tend to
be preferred over compensation for the expropriated owners. In the Venezuelan reform,
for example, only about one-third of the total cost of the land reform in its early years
went to compensate landowners. The comparable ratio in the postwar Italian land
reform was only twelve per cent, the rest of the cost going to land development, farm
credit, and other investments aimed at consolidating the reform. CARROLL, REFLECTIONS
ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT 2 (English mimeo ed. 1964)
(Spanish version in 1 TEMAS DEL BID 19 (1964)).
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In Mexico, increased economic equality did not result, even
though the distribution of land was confiscatory. The beneficiaries
did not have to pay for their land directly, but, through market
controls, the whole agricultural sector of the economy was forced to
contribute capital for the development of other sectors.123 Yet the
land reform did produce the social advantages enumerated.124 Therefore, the implication is that there is no necessary connection between
the achievement of greater economic equality and the achievement
of greater social equality; still, it seems doubtful that the social
benefits would have resulted if the campesinos had not expected
more than they ultimately received in the way of economic benefits
from the Revolution.
The question remains whether any land distribution of sufficient
scale to produce important social gains can be carried out if compensation is paid. The probationary answer, based mainly upon
what we know about the Mexican reform, is affirmative, but a
gloomy qualification that dispels hope for nonconfiscatory solutions
must be added. The qualification is that a reforming government
seemingly cannot have land distribution, compensation, and rapid
industrial growth at the expense of the agricultural sector. If the
beneficiaries of the land reform are to be bled in order to promote
non-agricultural development, they cannot, at the same time, finance
the purchase of the land that has been distributed to them. The
social and economic cases for confiscation thus blend together, and
it is to the more strictly economic arguments that we now must turn.
Economists can construct models for underdeveloped economies
that show clear gains to be realized from confiscation of property
in order to divert its income from consumption to investment in a
forced-draft expansion; 125 it behooves laymen not to try to challenge
the validity of such demonstrations. However, the historical record
12!1. It is generally assumed that the extractive sectors-agriculture, forestry, mining,
etc.-must provide an important part of the initial accumulation of capital for a
developing country's "take-off." See Rosrow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 21-24
(1960).
124. One writer comments that it is still true that blue-eyed blondes have the
advantage in the social pages of Mexico City newspapers, but that for political success
there is nothing like dark skin. FLORES, REFoRMA AGRARIA. EN MExlco 460 (Univ. of
Chile mimeo, 1962).
125. E.g., Bronfenbrenner, The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development,
3 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 201 (1955) (emphasis given to Soviet
and Chinese experience). Cf. Garnick, "The Appeal of Confiscation" Reconsidered: A
Gaming Approach to Foreign Economic Policy, 11 EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE !15!1 (1963), and Bronfenbrenner, Second Thoughts on Confiscation,
11 id. at !167.
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in Latin America remains cloudy, whatever may be the case in
Eastern Europe. It is true that Mexico has experienced a more rapid
development than have other Latin-American countries, and, arguably, its largely confiscatory land reform was an important cause of
the growth. The argument runs as follows: 126 Land reform brought
an end to the Mexican caste system, giving rural workers new possibilities for improvement of their position and new incentive for
efforts in that direction. In a horizontal sense, the land reform also
contributed to an increased mobility; farm workers were able to
leave the countryside in order to seek city employment. 127 The expropriated landowners did not lose all their property; instead, for
the most part, they retained their investments in urban land. With
the growth of the cities, this land rapidly increased in value, so that
much of the former landed class provided a nucleus of capital for
the new industrialization. Roads and irrigation projects took on
urgent importance. A major share of the government's meager resources was devoted to these ends and could not be used to compensate expropriated landowners. The construction industry faced
an unprecedented demand, not only for the items of social overhead
capital, but also for urban housing. Subsidiary industries developed.
Also, the abandonment of the hacienda system required its replacement by a market economy in agriculture. Through these changes
enough internal capital was formed to sustain the nation's growth
without substantial foreign investment, which was frightened away
and did not return until World War II.
The economic growth argument finally comes to this: The
hacienda society is static, uninterested in investment. A redistribution of land requires a reorientation of the economy toward "modern" goals-e.g., profit and full employment-which, in turn, forces
new investment. With Keynes, the reformers argue that an increase
in consumption (and thus demand for products) is a function of
increases in investment. The conclusion is that the Mexican ex126. This sanguine picture of the Mexican reform is taken mainly from the writings
of Dr. Edmundo Flores, whose works are cited frequently in these notes. It is reaffirmed
by Glade, Revolution and Economic Development, in GLADE 8e ANDERSON, THE PoLIT·
!CAL ECONOMY OF MEXICO 3, 52-71 (1963); cf. VERNON, THE DILEMMA OF MEXICO'S
DEVELOPMENT 78-86 (1963); Hirschman, Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin
America, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 3, 29-35 (Hirschman ed.
1961). A more general analysis, emphasizing the importance of land distribution in
encouraging low-level development decisions, is in Raup, The Contribution of Land
Reforms to Agricultural Development, 12 ECONOMIC DEVELOfMENT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE I (1963).
127. Country-to-city migration may also be explained on the basis of the repulsions
of rural life. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, WHY LAlloR LEAVES THE LAND
(Studies and Reports, n.s., 1960).
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perience tends to validate Keynes' thesis that the magnitude of a
nation's income is a function of the equality of its distribution.128
Those who urge the foregoing analysis cannot claim that the
rural population has shared evenly in Mexico's economic growth.
The opposite seems to be true; if any class may be said to have
financed the development process in Mexico, the campesino class
seems a likely candidate.129 Nor can it be claimed that the lands
distributed in the reform have been substantially more productive
than they might have been in the absence of a confiscatory distribution.130 The agriculture that feeds the non-farm population is the
technically advanced, large-scale agriculture located in areas that
have never been heavily populated and that were, in great measure,
outside the area of cultivation at the time of the early distributions
of land.131 It is arguable, however, that these lands have been opened
up to production because of the aid of the road-building and irrigation projects that the reform brought and that might not have
resulted in the absence of a reform. An even more pe!suasive argument is that these lands might never have been freed for commercial
agriculture if there had not been a breakup of the haciendas. Finally,
it is questionable that new foreign capital, particularly new capital
from the United States, was wholly barred or withheld from the
Mexican economy during the stated period. 'There are those who
say that new North American investment continued in very large
quantities during the Cardenas era through the use of front-men
who were Mexican, despite local "Mexicanization" requirements and
despite the threat of confiscation.132
128. See FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA. 89-94 (1961).
129. This is not to say that the reform has failed to benefit the campesinos. The fall
in infant mortality in the Mexican countryside surely reflects the basic fact that the
campesinos began to eat better immediately after the distribution. They had an understandable tendency to regard cattle as food rather than as a capital item, with the
result that herds were decimated at the outset of the reform. See FLORES, op. dt.
supra note 124, at 455-56.
130. Dr. Flores notes that much land is being used more intensively because of
rapid urbanization: industrial uses, dairy farms near cities, and truck farms have all
increased in number. Those uses, however, are at best indirect results of the land
distribution.
131. "Productivity, the basic factor in real income, has risen for the private sector
of the Laguna economy but, on average, has fallen for the ejidal sector [comprised of
land distributed in the reform].'' SENIOR, LAND REFoRM AND DEMOCRACY 189 (1958). The
same author goes on to explain the difference and to warn "against any generalization
that the cooperative ejido is inherently less productive than the private farm.'' Id. at
193. (Emphasis added.) Other students of Mexican agriculture, however, are willing to
make this generalization, at least with respect to historical production levels. Interview
with Dr. Donald Freebaim, Rockefeller Foundation, in Mexico City, March 27, 1963.
Out of some five million-plus units of agricultural exploitation in Mexico, around four
million are estimated to be subsistence farms. Interview with Ing. Arnaldo Lerma
Anaya, in Mexico City, April 16, 1963.
132, Such an assertion is hard to verify, because it rests on assumptions about con-
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The trouble with this sort of evaluation is that there is no "control" nation that sufficiently resembles an unreformed Mexico to
permit an unqualified assertion that the Mexican reform has or has
not played an indispensable role in the country's growth. In the
face of this appeal to history, however, it is proper to consider some
of the alternatives that have been advanced as measures with which
to achieve some of the benefits of a confiscatory land reform, without
some of its disadvantages.
Two such alternatives can be dismissed as illusory: mechanization
and colonization. Speaking generally, the introduction of machinery
does not create substantially greater per-acre productivity; it can
radically improve productivity per worker, but the chief result is the
displacement of labor to the urban unemployed class, not a more
intensive cultivation.133 Machines are costly, particularly when there
is a large and often-idle rural population available to do the same
work. Moreover, the use of machinery does not improve the wages
or the living conditions of rural labor. Colonization, on the other
hand, can increase production by putting new land to use. Further,
the living conditions of the beneficiaries of colonization are undeniably improved. But the trouble with colonization is its staggering cost. 134 No doubt, effective (though costly) colonization projects
are possible in some areas, such as the lowlands of Bolivia, where
fertile lands are underpopulated; nonetheless, to suggest colonization
as a substitute for the distribution of land is unrealistic in the extreme.
cealment. Even if it is true, it does not necessarily justify an anti-reform conclusion,
for it amounts to an assertion that, to an important extent, foreign c_;apital was not
frightened away by the reform. See VERNON, op. cit. supra note 126, at '22.
133. One early (1939) study in Mexico indicated only a slight advantage for mechanized farms in per-hectare production, and a substantial advantage per man-day.
Quoted in SENIOR, op. cit. supra note 131, at 174. The presence of machinery may
indicate a more businesslike attitude on the part of the individual farmer; that does
not suggest that mechanization is a general solution to the problem of low production•.
The introduction of some kinds of machinery, e.g., water pumps in arid areas, may
put new land to work and cause an increase in the need for labor. See FLORES, TRATADO
DE EcoNOMIA AGRICOLA 216 (1961). For the view that small farms, using little machinery
but intensive labor, can be highly efficient, see SCHULTZ, op. cit. supra note 79, at
122-24.
134. Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank have privately estimated the
cost of some colonization projects supported by the Bank at. levels which reach twenty
thousand dollars to fifty thousand dollars per family settled. Colonization on public land
avoids some costs, such as those of acquiring privately owned land; but it more than
makes up for that saving in its demands for social overhead capital items such as roads,
sanitation facilities, and electric power installations, not to mention housing, schools,
or even irrigation projects. See Bernal, Land Tenure Problems of Colombia, in LAND
TENURE 289 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956); cf. FLORES, LAND REFORM AND THE
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 8-9 (1963).
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Certain other alternatives that have been suggested are more
plausible. They fall into two broad categories, taxation and labortenancy regulation. Even these two may blend together, as in the
State of Sao Paulo's (Brazil) abortive land reform law, which imposed a progressive property tax (according to size of holdings) on
rural land but excepted from the tax's application landowners who
complied with detailed regulations of living and working conditions
for their labor force. 135 Viewed abstractly, progressive-rate taxation
can be just as effective as a land reform in producing a redistribution
of income. The fact is, however, that income redistribution through
levelling forms of taxation has historically taken place only in highly
developed countries. In the underdeveloped world, such a proposal
is apt not to be taken seriously, principally because no tax system is
any better than its machinery for administration and enforcement.
Not only is there a long tradition of tax evasion and official corruption in these countries, but there is also the usual shortage of trained
personnel to man the administration that an effective tax system
demands. Furthermore, taxation is a year-to-year proposition. While
today's administration may be sympathetic to the goals of a tax reform, tomorrow's may take a more relaxed attitude toward enforcement; it is more difficult to undo a redistribution of land.
Regulations aimed at improving the security, income, and living
conditions of rural tenants or agricultural laborers are equally suspect in the eyes of reformers who favor more radical solutions, at
least partly for similar reasons.136 The labor legislation of many
countries of Latin America is sufficiently advanced that it might
serve as a model for more developed countries, but its enforcement
often seems t0 depend upon the presence of a strong union or some
special political motivation such as an approaching election. Any
continuing obligation requires supervision, and, at present, there are
not even enough administrators to run such existing government
programs as the tax and agricultural extension systems. 137
Ultimately, all these alternative solutions are rejected by some
135. Law No. 5,994, Dec. 30, 1961. Opponents of this legislation sabotaged it by an
impressive political end run; they persuaded the National Congress to transfer the
functions of assessment and collection of property taxes from the states to municipalities, which were more amenable to suggestion from the landowners. For a rosier view
of tax reform in Latin America, see Martin, Future of the Alliance for Progress, 47
DEP'T STA.TE BuLL. 951, 955 (1962); cf. Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn
To Tax1, 41 FOiu:IGN MFA.IRS 410 (1963).
136. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
137. Uruguay and Argentina are exceptions, but they do not belong in the same
class of underdevelopment as the rest of the region. See text accompanying note 82
supra.
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radical reformers precisely because they are not sufficiently revolutionary and do not imply destruction of the power of the landed class
any more than they imply any substantial redistribution of income.
Those who support a more fundamental kind of land reform argue
that genuine changes in the pattern of income distribution are not
possible so long as political and economic power remain in the hands
of those who would be called upon to give up some of what they
have. 138 Thus, confiscation serves an additional political purpose
which may be instrumental in achieving the social and economic
goals of a reform. It is this attitude on the part of fundamental reformers which no doubt causes less radical alternatives to be proposed
by those who stand to lose the most if the radicals have their way.
So much for the arguments for confiscation. They are presented
here in their most favorabl~ light, not for purposes of advocacy, but
rather that they might be seen for what they are: rather traditional
appeals to traditional values. It should be obvious, however, that
the arguments lose much of their force when all moderate-sized to
large rural holdings are confiscated indiscriminately, whether or
not their ownership has produced the evils that make reform necessary. The legislative principle of the social function of ownership
comes in here-or, more accurately, ought to come in here.
Consider first the issue of capital formation. Confiscation does
not, by itself, form capital. Indeed, the short-range effect of a uniformly confiscatory policy is surely the discouragement of private
investment, both domestic and foreign. But confiscation does give
control to the government over income produced by the confiscated
capital, which income can then be invested. A consistent policy limiting confiscation to rural land, the .ownership of which was failing to
fulfill its social function, would discourage primarily that private investment which exploits land in a manner that ought to be discouraged. However, if the government should be concerned about preventing capital flight or compelling investment of the income derived
from land that is producing effectively, there are legislative ways
other than confiscation to achieve the desired ends, such as controls
over the exportation of capital or tax incentives for local invest138. FLORES, op. cit. supra note 134, at 12, arguing that the action of the United
States in entrusting a social revolution to "the safe conservative element," i.e., the
various Latin-American governments, "is the same as if Abraham Lincoln had expected
the Southern slave owners to expropriate themselves.'' Still, the alternatives to working
with the existing Latin-American governments are not immediately apparent. Cf.
KAUTSKY, POLITICAL CHANGE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: NATIONALISM AND CoMMU·
NISM 47 (1962) (Intellectuals "press for land reform not because of anything it will do

for the peasants, but because of what it will do to the aristocracy').
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ment. 130 It seems unwise to take land solely for the purpose of controlling the investment of its income when the land is already
cultivated intensively by a well-paid and secure labor force. Although
the threat of expropriation may be useful to a government that
wishes to encourage local investment, for this purpose expropriation
ought to be a last resort.
It was stated earlier that intensive farming, using labor that is
paid a living wage in cash, is inconsistent with the most basic features
of the hacienda.140 In the present context, it may be remarked that
this kind of large-scale commercial farming does not result in the
evils that justify a land reform: the labor force is mobile in a horizontal sense, for its principal economic tie to the land is a cash wage,
and, when better wages are offered elsewhere, an economically rational choice may be made; vertical mobility depends less upon land
ownership than upon such things as the erosion of social caste boundaries, the education of the rural population, and the ability of the
campesino to comprehend that there is a way up. When ownership
performs the labor-relations portion of its social function, there is
no need for a distribution of land title to be the first rung on the
"agricultural ladder.'' 141
Apart from the support offered by the theory of restitution, much
of the legitimacy of confiscation depends upon faithful adherence to
the principles that go by the name of "the social function of ownership.'' Tested against that standard, and leaving Mexico aside, the
only recent land reform in Latin America that can be given high
marks is that of Venezuela. No doubt it will be said that Venezuela
is a special case because of the government's revenue from petroleum.
True enough, Venezuela can better afford to pay compensation than
can either Bolivia or Cuba. But the foregoing analysis does not
assume even a relatively wealthy government. The point is, when
ownership has been fulfilling its social function, there is normally
no need to expropriate at all, in a confiscatory manner or otherwise.142
139. See Ross&: CHRISTENSEN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN MEXICO (1959). The
administrative problems implicit in a program to prevent capital flight are similar to
those suggested for other programs of regulation or taxation; see text at note 135
supra. Enforcement of anti-capital-flight legislation would perhaps be somewhat
easier, because fewer individuals would require supervision.
140. See text at note 79 supra.
141. This is "the time honored scale of tenure rights ranging from the landless
laborer through tenancy to indebted owner and unencumbered ownership." Parsons,
Land Reform and Agricultural Development, in LAND TENURE 3, 13 (Parsons, Penn
&: Raup ed. 1956).
142. However, even the Venezuelan law (in art. 33) provides for the expropriation
of land, the ownership of which is fulfilling its social function, "when it becomes
necessary to organize land in a given place, and when the existence thereat of one or
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Ownership of that kind is making an effective contribution to the
nation's development and is not likely to be improved upon by the
newly distributed ownership interests created during a land reform.
Any minimal gains realized from the confiscation of these lands will
be more than offset by the temporary dislocations of the reform
process and by the harder to calculate, but probably more lasting,
effects upon private investor psychology.
Fundamental land reforms have, in the past, proceeded from
revolutionary governments. It is not easy for such a government to
heed counsels of moderation, especially when they come from the
outside, even from investor nations. The degree to which a revolutionary government can limit its confiscations to interests that
"deserve" to be confiscated will depend upon the measure of its control over the forces that have made the revolution. This is not a
question of legitimacy but of power. 148 The conclusions reached here
with regard to the legitimacy of various confiscatory practices are,
however, based upon justifications as they might appear to an expropriating government; they are not based upon international
standards, which may be suspect in the eyes of reformers since they
have been established by capital-exporting nations. 14'4
more properties forms a technical or economic obstacle to proper execution of the
scheme •••." In such a case, the most desirable bonds (class "C": IO-year terms, with
interest at the market rate) are given, and cash payment is made for all improvements,
livestock, and mortgages incurred for development purposes. An owner in Venezuela
thus has a motive for arguing that his ownership has fulfilled its social function; and,
even though he may not expect to prevent expropriation, he may convince the court
that he deserves this less confiscatory form of compensation. See the record cited in
note 91 supra. A similar provision is contained in Honduras, art. 42, copied in part
from the Venezuelan law.
143. This article might have contained another section, dealing with confiscation
as a form of punishment. Confiscation on this basis, urged by Zapata against opponents
of the Revolution, see note 20 supra, has been' used widely only by the government of
Cuba, although other countries have also enacted "malversation" laws aimed at recovering the ill-gotten gains of ousted dictators and their friends. See Perez Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914, petition for
rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963), discussing the charges of malversation against
the former Venezuelan dictator in an extradition proceeding. Concerning confiscation
as a political weapon, see CuBA AND THE RuLE OF I.Aw 110-ll, 123-25, 241-45 (Int'!
Comm'n of Jurists, 1962). Because theories of war indemnity and punishment are
apt to become identified with the need to reduce the power base of the political
opposition, such theories may be irresistibly attractive to a revolutionary government. The informal execution of punitive confiscations in Cuba lends little support
for the legitimacy of the theory.
144. For a modern effort to formulate standards that are appropriate for developing nations' expropriations in connection with social reform, see COMM. ON INT'L
TRADE AND INVESTMENT (A.B.A.), THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED
ABROAD (1963); Dawson &: Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727 (1962); Sohn &: Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545,
553 (1961); cf. Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. lNT'L L. 585 (1961). The tradi-
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UTILITY OF RATIONALIZATIONS

One way or another, every land reform in Latin America has been
confiscatory. 145 Granting that, why do grown men engage in elaborate
let's-pretend games in order to avoid the charge of confiscation?
A predictable reply is that the reforming governments are afraid
to irritate the governments and private investing interests of investor
countries such as the United States. But, although it is undoubtedly
true that international respectability is important even to revolutionary governments, this explanation is misleadingly over-simple. North
American interests that are affected by a land reform are not so
unsophisticated that they will fail to notice the extent to which their
property is confiscated; nor are they likely to fail to call the attention
of the United States Government to their plight. The word will
quickly pass among private investors and international lending
agencies, who will certainly look beyond self-serving descriptions by
the reforming governments to the effects of their reforms. Yet it
would be wrong to dismiss the various rationalizations for confiscation as unimportant to development. Although the connections may
be m·ore easily felt than articulated, an attempt to identify them i&
worth a try.
Whatever the degree of state control over the economy, development depends upon a great many decisions, the making of which is
often necessarily decentralized. Planning at any level, public or
private, is likely to be successful in fairly direct proportion to the
predictability of the future. Decisions that promote development,
particularly decisions to save or invest, are easier to make in a climate
of relative stability and security, and those terms imply predictions
about the future. Like all expressions of probabilty, assertions about
security are estimates based upon incomplete knowledge and, therefore, are not helpful unless they are explicitly identified with the
standpoint of some observer. For the purposes of the present analysis
a variety of observers must be considered, not all of whom share the
same perspective. The expropriated owner of a hacienda will not be
deceived into thinking that compensation in long-term agrarian
bonds, at a valuation based upon the hacienda's history of low production, is the same as immediate payment in cash for the land's
tional international standard of prompt, full, and effective compensation was advocated
in an aide-memoire to the Guatemalan government, protesting, among other things,
the use of agrarian bonds for compensation. Expropriation of United Fruit Company
Property by Government of Guatemala, 29 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 357 (1953); cf. Kunz, The
Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 327, 349-59 (1940).
145. Here "land reform" is equated-as it should be-with "fundamental" reforms.
See note 90 supra and text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
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market value. But his estimate of the future-his security-is the
least of our concerns. Instead, the reforming government ought to
worry about the effect of its reforms upon other investors in the
agricultural and other sectors of the economy. What effect will the
rationalizations for confiscation have upon the investment decisions
of the efficient operator of a large-scale agricultural enterprise, or of
the banker who is considering an agricultural loan, or of the small
farmer who is thinking about buying a tractor? How will those rationalizations affect decisions to buy, build, or finance urban housing? How will they affect decisions to finance the expansion of manufacturing plant capacity?
It is necessary to narrow these questions even further and to
relate them to particular rationalizations. Deferred payment and
reduced valuation are sufficiently transparent that they can fool only
those decision-makers at the very lowest levels of sophistication;
certainly, they will not fool the entrepreneurs and lending institutions who will make the most important individual decisions to save
or invest. But the other basic rationalizations-the theory of restitution and the doctrine of the social function of ownership-do not
rest upon delusion. They do reinforce investment security because
they give important assurance about the future to potential investors.
The great beauty of the restitution theory is that it purports to
protect property interests, restoring to the "true" owners what is
their own. In operation, restitution may have an equalizing effect,
but it is not explicitly premised upon achieving equality. It is, by
its own terms, not so likely to recur and, therefore, not so likely to
raise those insecurities about which Bentham warned a century and
more ago:
"If equality ought to prevail to-day it ought to prevail always ....
How make another distribution without taking away from each
that which he has? And how despoil any without attacking the
security of all? When your new repartition is disarranged-that
is to say, the day after its establishment-how avoid making a
second? Why not correct it in the same way? And in the meantime what becomes of security? What is happiness? Where is
industry?" 146
•
One important reason why Mexico's post-reform economy eventually prospered was that potential investors were convinced that the
land reform did not imply a governmental dedication to continual
leveling. The fact that investments in urban land and most industrial
146. BENTIIAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 119-20 (1876). (The two quotations are
reversed in order. The citation is to Hildreth's 1908 re-translation from the French
version of Dumont.)
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investments were left untouched was important not only in leaving a
reservoir of capital to be invested, but also in giving security to investors of the future.
The social function doctrine is even more useful. As that doctrine
is now interpreted, one of the principal grounds for expropriation
is inadequate investment. Conversely, if the social function principle
is carefully applied, one who invests knows that his investment is
secure as long as he produces effectively and compensates his labor
force adequately. These are capitalist virtues; just as the Mexican
Revolution "laid the bases of Mexican capitalism,"147 so all the
reforming governments of Latin America-with Cuba the lone
exception-have made it clear that they propose, not the abandonment of capitalism, but rather an adjustment to make of modern
capitalism an effective successor to the curious combination of mercantilism and feudalism that prevailed before.148
In this process even deception has its place. The pretense that
compensation is being made to the expropriated landowners may, for
example, help to assure the beneficiaries of the land distribution
that their own titles are secure-that the land has been purchased,
not stolen, from its former owners. A small farmer whose title is
secure is more likely to save and invest than is his counterpart who
lacks confidence in his future as an owner. I£ the establishment of
security of tenure for the reform's beneficiaries is an important objective of a reforming government, then it is not objectionable to try
to reinforce the beneficiaries' legal protections with the psychological
support that may come from the fiction of compensation for landowners. For the small farmer as well as for the industrial investor,
security is first of all a state of mind.
Apart from the direct encouragement of low-level development
decisions, there is another more important reason for maintaining the
myth of compensation. A social revolution, whether or not it is
accompanied by widespread violence, is necessarily disorderly and
disruptive. The maintenance of order is the first great task of a
revolutionary government, and it is as important as any task that faces
a non-revolutionary government that seeks to make its social revolution without violence. In the countries of Latin America, most of
147. Carlos Fuentes, quoted in Hirschman, supra note 126, at 31.
148. This position recalls Franklin D. Roosevelt, who once described the New Deal
as "a revolution of the Right" to save capitalism. The New Dealers, many of them
lawyers, knew the value of tying their social reforms to precedent. See Freund, Social
Justice and the Law, in SOCIAL JusnCE 93, 116-17 (Brandt ed. 1962): "The accommodation between stability and change is representative of the ultimate task of the law-the
resolution of the ambiguities and antinomies of human aspirations ••••"
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which have seen major upheavals in every generation since their
independence, the need for stability is particularly acute. Stability
implies respect for law, either voluntary or coerced or-surely most
typically-a mixture of both. Any open disavowal by the government
of one of the institutions of the established order carries with it the
risk of a lessening of public respect for the order generally. Open
confiscation of rural land does not compel other repudiations of
established rights, but it does make those repudiations politically
.more difficult to resist. To the extent that confiscation is successfully
disguised, the leaders of a reforming government may reduce the
popular pressure for immediate, disruptive extension of the social
revolution to every comer of the nation and may, at the same time,
avoid the invitation to lawlessness that is implicit in a frankly confiscatory reform. 149
Finally, even if all efforts to conceal the confiscatory nature of
a land reform fail, there is some utility in continuing to assert the
principle of compensation. There is no intention on the part of any
reforming government in Latin America to abandon the rule of just
compensation as a principle of posHeform general application. The
period of a land reform is a period of social emergency; that emergency will not last forever. If it is necessary during the emergency
to subordinate one or another constitutionally protected interest,
it is probably better to do so covertly, all the while professing the
continued vitality of the constitutional protections. When the emergency passes, it will perhaps be easier to give real protection to those
interests than it might be if they had been frankly disavowed during
the time of crisis. Our own constitutional history can provide models
that will serve very well. 150
Latin-American opinion makers, educated in Western traditions
of legality, find confiscation distasteful and difficult to admit even to
themselves. Thus, the needs of the collective conscience of the leadership group combine with the indispensable demands of orderly
development to require formal repudiation of confiscation. While
it seems to be true that "either we pay for the land or we make a
land reform," 151 the need to rationalize the reform with traditional
standards of legitimacy makes deception inevitable.
149. Even in the Soviet Union, the expropriation of property is now compensated
at "market" value (in the case of immovables, a fixed price controlled by the government). 2 GsovsKI, SovIET CIVIL LAw 79-81 (1949).
150. Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), with Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); cf. Warren, The
Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 181, 191-93 (1962).
151. CHONCHOL, LA REFORMA AGRARIA EN AMERICA LATINA 26 (Univ. of Chile,
mimeo, 1962).

